

FOOD STAMP TARGET DAVID TABACOFF

THE


NATION

APRIL 3, 1976

50 cents

Post-Mortem on the Hiss Case Carey McWilliams

**Rep. Les Aspin
Rattling Dollars,
Rubles and Sabers
BUDGET TIME
AT THE PENTAGON**



Why I Support Jimmy Carter Rep. Andrew Young

FACE-OFF IN PANAMA

PENNY LERNOUX

U.S. Imperialists, Old and New

DISTINGUISHED BY THE SPARROW'S VISIT RONALD SAMPSON

APR 29 1976

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LETTERS

more on Zionism and Israel

Southfield, Mich.

I thank you for publishing Irene Gendzier's "The Israeli Debate We Never Hear" [*The Nation*, Feb. 14]. . . . It gives us a point of view which has been suppressed. . . . I am gratified to learn that there are voices in Israel which are not in agreement with American Zionist policies. It is important for us to know all the facts about the Middle East since it affects our very lives. I am a Jew but not a Zionist.

Sam Sweet

New York City

I am moved to thank you for such a sensible article as Irene Gendzier's on the Israeli-Arab conflict.

I knew the answer long ago after I visited twice, but I never could convince my Israeli friends that the first move was theirs to break the deadlock with a gesture of generosity and compassion for those who regarded the land as theirs. . . .

Roger N. Baldwin

New Haven, Conn.

I very much appreciated Professor Gendzier's recent article in *The Nation*. . . . Our paper is sharply opposed to the right-wing Zionist hawks who dominate the Jewish establishment and we have reported favorably on the disenchantment of Israeli Zionists with the government's hard-line policy.

Sid Resnick, The Morning Freiheit

White Plains, N.Y.

It was with dismay that I read Irene Gendzier's "The Israeli Debate We Never Hear". . . .

There has never been, as the article charges, any subject that has been "virtually taboo" in the American Jewish community, as anyone acquainted with the milieu knows. The publications *Brerah* and *Sh'ma*, both influential intellectual journals, have presented divergent and independent opinions by serious Jewish thinkers. That there are fewer articles in *Commentary* sympathetic to a Palestinian state now than there were in March of 1946 should not be surprising; a series of events have occurred since then which have changed some minds. For one, the Arab peoples were encouraged to abandon their homes in 1948, so that a "holy war" could be waged against the partition of Palestine. These people were promised a swift return after the inevitable cleanup operation. If the majority of Jews have a respect for the lessons of history, this redounds to their credit and, if it doesn't, it deserves a better dismissal than epithets like "hawkish elements in the Zionist lobby in the United States." . . .

Louis Ehrenkrantz

Lowell, Mass.

As an American who has resided in Israel, I returned to the United States to find out that, to a great extent, Professor Gendzier's comments are true. The average American Jew is reluctant to confront himself and his fellow citizens on the subject of Zionism and the Palestinians. . . . He looks upon Israel as a parent views his offspring, to be nurtured and protected. . . .

Articles such as Professor Gendzier's should help . . . disseminate minority Israeli opinions on these matters. . . .

Esther R. Schlesinger

cotton song

Berkeley, Calif.

Regarding your editorial [March 27] on the song I wrote called *Carolina Cotton Mill Song*, based on the article on brown lung in the textile mills by Fran Lynn in your February 21st issue, I wish to inform your readers that any of them who would like a lead sheet of it can get one by sending a large stamped, self-addressed envelope to Schroder Music Co., 2027 Parker St., Berkeley, Calif. 94704.

Malvina Reynolds

EDITORIALS

Good Week for Carter

After North Carolina's primary, the public (not the candidates) is given time to breathe and even to think before the crucial two primaries of New York and Wisconsin on April 6. The Reagan win in North Carolina, his first in six tries, will keep him in the Republican two-man race. The Democrats have a three-man contest, though Jimmy Carter, after soundly beating Wallace in North Carolina, says it's down to two—Jackson and himself (and his analyses now have to be listened to).

Reagan's victory will prevent Ford from making his quite openly planned shift toward the Center. He must still court those right-wing votes, having failed to smash the challenge of the even more reactionary Reagan. Accordingly, Ford's inevitable centrism during the actual Presidential campaign will be less than believable, the conversion having come so late. The Democrats should profit from the kind of cynical politics on the part of an incumbent President which makes it possible for a *New York Times* reporter (March 24) to write that Reagan's victory in North Carolina "is likely to oblige Mr. Ford to keep his own stance conservative longer than he wanted to."

So we will have more of Henry Kissinger's ominous electioneering. In Dallas on the day of the North Carolina primary, the Secretary of State talked loudly and shook the big stick at Cuba, using words which permitted the *Times* to run the headline, "Says Washington Will Not Rule Out an Invasion if Havana Acts in Africa." Kissinger is a faithful spear carrier for candidate Ford, as he was for Nixon, no matter what the consequences to American foreign policy. And they are nearly disastrous. As Penny Lernoux's article in this issue makes plain, struggles on the Republican Right have paralyzed the long attempt to reach a rational solution to the problem of the Panama Canal.

On the Democratic side, one should note that Morris Udall, our preferred candidate in the field, is still in the race. But he lags and could well disappear as a serious option after April 6. Jimmy Carter would then have been right in his judgment (which has been sharp from the start) that it is between him and the dull and hawkish Jackson.

In this issue we have an appraisal of Carter by the interesting, intelligent and warmly pro-Carter black Congressman from Atlanta, Andrew Young, a veteran of the best of the "liberal" politics of the so-called New South. We are all going to have to take a hard look at Carter, who is becoming truly formidable, and we propose to examine his positions and policies in a forthcoming issue.

'Intelligence' and Horse Sense

Three adjacent little stories, together measuring less than a column of type in the back pages of the March 19th *New York Times*, tell as much about the present climate of opinion on the democratic "right to know" as half a dozen learned volumes.

The first one's small headline reads:

Aerospace Institute Bids Newsmen Quit Over Leak

The "leak" in this case was a report by a journalist named Arthur Kranish, editor of *Science Trends*, a newsletter, of a so-called background briefing by "senior officials of the Central Intelligence Agency." It was what is known to the hierarchical world of security as a "nonclassified briefing," but this classification seems to mean to the initiates "speak no evil, even if you hear it." What Kranish and his fellow members of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics heard the high CIA official say was that Israel possessed anywhere from ten to twenty nuclear weapons "available for use."

The question of Israel's possession or nonpossession of a nuclear capability has been much rumored, debated, denied and generally agitated for years without any clear resolution of the mystery. Now here was a "senior official" of the CIA in a "nonclassified" session called a "backgrounder" saying that indeed the gossip was true and putting a number on the Israeli nuclear arsenal. It was a very interesting, even startling, disclosure about the balance of force in the Middle East, and derived from what must be called "a qualified source." Kranish thought he should reveal this unclassified intelligence revelation, and wrote an article on it which *The Washington Post* published. For his professional pains, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics has told Kranish the "honorable action for you" is to resign. (Kranish is talking to his lawyer first.)

The CIA has lately been going through an "open" phase. The dagger may still be poised, but the cloak is lifted, at least the hem, while Congress tries to decide what kind of controls it should try to impose on this previously unchecked agency of Presidential intervention abroad and, even more shockingly, at home. The former head of CIA, William Colby, whom President Ford fired in what seems to have been more a White House cleaning than a purge, spent his last months in a paroxysm of openness, going around posing as the outspoken manager of your friendly neighborhood spy shop. In this phase, which is not likely to last long, it is apparently all right for the higher spies to come in from the cold and tell all about the weaponry of our friends abroad. They leave it to the ground rules of the groups with which they share these dangerous secrets to define a "leak" and punish the leakers. It would seem that this single revelation of an Israeli nuclear capability would be more damaging both to stability in the Middle East and to the reputation for discretion of American intelligence agencies than ten or twenty Pike Committee reports.

But the "intelligence community" is taking precautionary measures on another front. The headline right below the Kranish "leak" story reads:

U.S. Halts Two Booklets Used to Spot C.I.A. Agents

The story says that the State Department has stopped publication of the *Foreign Service List* and that when its *Biographic Register* appears again it will be classified "for official use only." These two listings have made it famously easy for even an untutored spy to detect, behind clumsy "cover" jobs, the likely espionage functions of many of this country's operatives abroad. The most notable recent case was that of Richard Welch, a CIA agent in Athens,

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mysteriously murdered after he had been identified as such and his name had been published in various anti-U.S. intelligence publications. There was much official indignation at the anti-CIA groups that made known his true identity, and Welch was given what amounted to a state funeral and buried in Arlington National Cemetery. The trail he left behind him was quite clear in those official publications which have now at last been suppressed or classified. This story is not so much about the right to know as it is on belated prudence and common sense on the part of the U.S. Government.

Finally, and from another world, is the story headlined:

Amins Lose Positions In Cairo Press Shifts

It concerns two brothers who prospered and gained influence as newspaper publishers in Egypt after the military threw out King Farouk. Now President Anwar el-Sadat has removed them from the newspapers they started thirty years ago and announced that, though they can stay on as writers, they will be replaced as editors by men with "no hatred for the Socialist Revolution."

It is not a bad idea to remind ourselves that that is how the press is handled in most of the world and that the First Amendment—still in force—is what makes such things difficult, if not impossible, here.

The Nixon Pouch

It was good of Richard Nixon to grant the man he made President a peek at the 60-page report on his visit to China. Mr. Ford was not allowed to make copies, of course—that would not be in the interests of what Nixon used to call "national security." In fact, the two copies of the Nixon report on his conversation with Mao Tse-tung and his ten hours with Acting Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng were whisked into and out of Washington (where, we are told, only four pairs of eyes were permitted to scan them) in such a gingerly way that they might have been literally explosive.

Henry Kissinger, possessor of two of the eight privileged eyes, is quoted as saying, lukewarmly, that the report was "generally helpful." That was more than the President said, since he said nothing. But then Kissinger had gone behind Mr. Ford's back a week or so earlier, squarely turning toward his embarrassing predecessor during the New Hampshire primary, and actually telephoning Nixon to see whether he had anything new and hot on the Chinese leadership puzzle. And Kissinger, the wily old intelligence operative, is quite capable of masking the importance of this ex-Presidential report behind a façade of apparent boredom.

One is left with mere speculation on the true contents of the report by the San Clemente nonemissary. We are asked to believe that no copies of this document remain in Washington (were the photocopiers all broken?). Perhaps Nixon slapped a copyright on them to protect the "literary" value of his investment in that trip to Peking, or to prepare for some new form of tax deduction.

There is one hint as to the real value of the Nixon China White Paperlet. It was fetched from the West Coast by White House courier, but it was sent back by ordinary mail.

Runnymede on Potomac

There is a wonderful irony in the Congressional wrangle over how and at what cost this country should procure the Magna Carta "original copy" from England, to serve as the centerpiece of this country's Bicentennial celebration. The "barons" of Congress have been disputing the matter as hotly as ever the peers of the realm of King John argued over what they could extract from the monarch before they met with the theretofore unchecked king on the field of Runnymede in June of 1215.

The English nobles got their basic charter, foundation of Anglo-Saxon liberties, only with the threat of civil war, and things have not quite reached that stage in the American Congress. But the debate over this elaborate junket (twenty-five Congressmen, plus wives and staff, are to accompany the hallowed document on its westward journey, at an estimated cost of some \$50,000) was full of cut and thrust. The acidulous Wayne Hays (D., Ohio), himself the tyrant of Congressional arrangements ranging from the House barbershop to the size of committee staffs, was at his dictatorial worst. Repelling an assault by a Republican penny pincher, Rep. Robert Bauman, (R., Md.), Hays reminded this Representative of Germanic ancestry that the American revolutionaries had whipped the Hessians and vaingloriously traced his own ancestry to Scotland a couple of centuries before the Magna Carta became law.

It developed that the delegation of twenty-five was invited by the Mother of Parliaments in Westminster and the debate turned on matters of courtesy toward our nearly bankrupt British cousins as against the look in an election year of such an expensive Congressional picnic. Finally, the House voted to send a delegation headed by Speaker Carl Albert (D., Okla.).

The truth is that amid all the nonsense and vulgarity of our celebration of the Bicentennial this is one of the more serious projects. It might even be a good idea to send over every single one of the 535 members of both bodies of Congress. They might learn something on the field at Runnymede about how to control the swollen power of the American Presidency, "imperial," in Arthur Schlesinger's phrase, if not yet quite a matter of divine right. If the cost to American democracy were a few more overweening "barons" in Congress, even of the stripe of Wayne Hays, we could stand that better than an unchecked Chief Executive. As it says at the end of the Magna Carta, "The King will not directly or indirectly do anything whereby these concessions may be revoked or diminished."

Full Speed to Nowhere

The motto of the Chicago "school" of economics, led by Prof. Milton Friedman, might well be "This Calculator For Hire." Friedman & Co. have hired themselves out as consultants to one of the world's most brutally repressive military dictatorships, the regime of General Pinochet in Chile. The ultraconservative monetarist from the University of Chicago comes complete with an "ethical" explanation for his mercenary consulting arrangement with the masters of Santiago. He argues that there is no chance for anything like a democratic government there until

(Continued on page 390)

Post-Mortem on the Hiss Case

Carey McWilliams

The Hiss case seemed to have passed into history until interest in it was revived by the disgrace of Richard Nixon, the death of J. Edgar Hoover, subsequent disclosures of FBI transgressions, and fresh insights provided by materials which have only recently been made available for study. Now the case has entered a new phase: historians, journalists, lawyers, scholars and investigators are poring over thousands of pages of documents recently pried loose from the Department of Justice and the FBI, with the result that what promises to be an intensive ongoing post-mortem on the case, which was tried twenty-six years ago, is well underway.

So intense is the revived interest in the case that premature conclusions are being proclaimed before the new materials have been properly studied and evaluated. On the same day (March 18) that John Chabot Smith's *Alger Hiss: The True Story* was published, *The New York Times* carried a front-page story with the head: "Professor Says Alger Hiss Lied About His Links With Chambers," the professor being Allen Weinstein of Smith College, author of *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case*, a book he hopes to complete by December or January for publication sometime in 1977. The remarks by Weinstein quoted in the *Times* were taken from his 6-page review of the Smith book which appears in *The New York Review* of April 1. Apparently, though it could have been a coincidence, the review was released to the *Times* before the issue of April 1 was on the stands, in order to make the headlines on the day that Smith's book was released. In any case, the resulting publicity has helped focus attention on Smith's book. Also on March 18 Hiss and Smith appeared at a crowded press conference at the time, almost to the hour, when Weinstein was conducting a seminar at Columbia University, not on the Hiss case but on his review of the Smith book. Individuals invited to both events found themselves in a quandary. Doubtless the timing of the seminar was unrelated to the timing of the press conference, but it was unfortunate all the same. At the seminar, as in the review, Weinstein made it quite clear that as of now he thinks Hiss was guilty.

As the post-mortem proceeds, as the materials thus far released and others that may be released undergo study, the competition for headlines should be minimized. At this point, surely, hard-and-fast conclusions are premature. Indeed Professor Weinstein's work has not been completed and Mr. Smith's book is really an introduction to the post-mortem, not part of it, since it was written before the previously classified materials, or all of them, were available. At the moment, the public cannot examine Weinstein's study—it has not been completed—and his review consists in attacks on portions of Smith's book which do not jibe, in Weinstein's view, with information to which Smith did not have access, as well as on points about which he and Smith disagree. As far as I can determine, no one can claim at this moment to have examined thoroughly all of the new materials, not to mention that the FBI still refuses to release 1,000 or more pages that could prove to be of special importance. Under the circumstances, the public should be wary about accepting conclusions expressed in a review by one

investigator of another investigator's book.

Throughout his review Weinstein accuses Hiss of having "lied" about various aspects of the case, although the evidence cited to sustain the charge is by no means conclusive. At the same time he insists that most of those who have previously written about the case have been "partisans," presumably because they were not academic historians. Actually the charge of partisanship is at best a partial truth. Fred J. Cook, for one, was initially convinced that Hiss was guilty; as editor of *The Nation* I had considerable difficulty in getting him to undertake a new investigation of the case. But in the course of that investigation he became convinced that Hiss should have been found not guilty. If he became a partisan of Hiss, he was not one when he began his inquiry, any more than Weinstein is a "partisan" because he was initially disposed to believe Hiss innocent, but later changed his mind. In such a highly controversial case, one group's "partisan" is another group's "scholar." And the word "liar," used repeatedly in the review, is a harsh term that should be used with care in a post-mortem of this kind, particularly when the evidence cited to support the epithet is less than conclusive. Since we are to have a post-mortem, it should proceed not in bits and pieces, in the form of book reviews and interviews, but in presentations that go directly and thoroughly to the merits of the case.

Several aspects of the current controversy require special emphasis. Professor Weinstein, with the aid of the ACLU and the consistent support of *The Nation* and other publications, has forced the release of a wealth of materials from the files of the FBI, and for that he is to be commended. But Alger Hiss has done the same. In fact, the materials Hiss has brought to light may exceed in volume those Weinstein has unearthed. Hiss also opened the defense files to Weinstein and others; many of the points which Weinstein makes against the Smith book are based on information obtained from the Hiss files.

Preoccupation with detail, with point making, is characteristic of academic polemics and can be entertaining, particularly to academicians. But the effect is unfortunate when it diverts attention from substantive issues. Many of the points made by Weinstein in his review are interesting but not of vital importance. On the other hand, one would not learn from his review that the new materials raise serious doubt about the identity of the typewriter that was received in evidence at the trial. This information suggests that the Woodstock typewriter introduced as an exhibit could not have been the family machine the Hisses had once owned. Weinstein lightly brushes aside the fact that it was the defense that produced a Woodstock machine; he implies that the defense probably did so because it had reason to believe that the FBI was certain to find the machine sooner or later. At best, this is mere conjecture and does not happen to square with the facts. Admittedly, the identity of the machine received in evidence is not clearly established; a Woodstock machine was found by the defense, it was received in evidence, it became the "silent" witness. But it may not have been the Woodstock for which both defense and prosecution had been searching.

The crux of the case, in a way, relates to the typewriter. After Hiss was convicted in 1950, Richard Nixon made a speech of self-glorification in the course of which he inserted in the *Congressional Record* a newspaper article by a reporter with excellent FBI connections in which it was said that the government, or "we," as Nixon would have it, had found the machine. He made a similar statement in his *Six Crises*, which he later qualified only after *The Nation* had called attention to it. Years later, he repeated the original story to White House staff assistants (it appears in the Watergate transcripts of the taped conversations). A report of HUAC also refers to the fact that the government had found the machine. In all, we can cite some six instances in which the statement was made that the government, not the defense, had found the machine. Yet every time the issue has come up, government spokesmen have blandly denied that the government ever had possession of the machine. These denials may be technically correct. It is possible that the machine the defense finally located was not the one the government—Nixon's "we," whoever they may be—had found. It may or may not have been a plant. But the uncertainty about the identity of the machine received in evidence is a vital issue which should be resolved. Weinstein concedes that the machine was "the crucial piece of missing evidence," but apparently feels that statements made by Alger and Priscilla Hiss that they had forgotten the make of the family machine or what had happened to it—statements made at a time when they were searching their memories for details of events that had happened ten years previously—are of greater significance than an FBI "urgent" telegram of May 17, 1949, stating that investigation had established that the Woodstock typewriter found by the Hiss defense could not have been the family Woodstock.

Then there is the matter of Chambers's statement to the FBI in which he acknowledged that he had once been involved in homosexual relations. This statement would have been quite important to the defense, which was attempting to establish a motive for Chambers's accusations against Hiss. At the trial, Prosecutor Thomas Murphy accused the defense of dirty tactics in offering testimony by psychiatrists bearing on Chambers's credibility, although at the time Murphy had in his possession the Chambers confession which, if it had been known to the defense, would have justified a fuller exploration into Chambers's motives. Here again the government concealed

material of major importance to the defense. At the time, of course, the rules about exculpatory materials had not been as firmly formulated as they are today; even so, this hardly justified the government's conduct. Perhaps these and other concealments do not warrant the charge "frame-up," but they are of much greater importance than the fact that Hiss may have been inaccurate about some details of marginal relevance or have momentarily forgotten a date or a fact.

Or consider a couple of further details. Weinstein points out in his review that Igor Gouzenko, a defector, had mentioned an agent who was an "assistant" to the Secretary of State and that Elizabeth Bentley once told the FBI that one of her contacts had mentioned Hiss as a member of the Communist underground. Yet neither Gouzenko nor Bentley claimed to have met Hiss or Chambers or each other. So what? This is gossip, not evidence; even as gossip, its repetition might well have been accompanied by a word or two of caution about accepting at face value anything said by Elizabeth Bentley. Her credibility as a professional witness turned informer was so thoroughly shredded that even the inquisitorial committees finally turned her out to pasture. Or again, Weinstein writes that Lee Pressman, a one-time Communist Party member, had recommended Hiss for his first New Deal job. But he does not mention Pressman's sworn testimony that neither Alger nor Donald Hiss had been members of that famous Washington underground cell. A cagey lawyer, Pressman was not the kind of witness who would walk blindly into a perjury trap.

One can sympathize with Professor Weinstein. He has been inundated with masses of new materials which he is in the process of digesting and organizing. Not surprisingly, he has become fascinated with this detail and that. In fact, he gave the impression at the Columbia University seminar of being so burdened by detail that he could not see the forest for the trees. His good faith is not in question, but his conclusions might better have been deferred until the full evidence on which they are based could have been examined. If he believes, as he does, that Hiss was guilty, then he should make his case directly, not in the form of a review of a book by an investigator who did not have full access to the new materials. The post-mortem now underway will be protracted—the more studies the better—but it should proceed with a minimum of headline-snatching competition. Nor should the word "liar" be bandied about on the basis of equivocal evidence.

(Continued from page 388)

Chile's economic chaos is brought under control.

The Friedman prescription goes under the name "shock treatment" in Chile (a grim joke in a country where the jails echo with the screams of political prisoners being tortured by actual electric shocks). The slightly more benign Friedman treatment involves harsh orthodox austerity programs which, as usual, cause the firing of thousands of workers, and whereby the poor pay for the sins and laxity of the rich "managers." But that is all right with Friedman & Co. as long as Chile goes on paying (as it will this year) interest of \$750 million on its huge foreign debt. As long as that tribute to capitalist orthodoxy is paid, the international bankers, led by the United States,

approve of what is done down there. And above all they approve politically. Commenting on the recent \$33-million loan made by the World Bank, of which Robert S. McNamara is president, Rep. Henry Reuss (D., Wis.) charged:

The documents suggest that the case for this loan relies not on the condition of the Chilean economy as revealed by traditional statistical measures but on the bank's favorable assessment of the policies undertaken by the Chilean Government since the assassination of President Allende.

It is true that the military dictatorship inherited a badly faltering economy from the Allende government which it violently overthrew (inflation then was running at a rate of

more than 700 per cent a year, and it is now down to about half that rate, which is still the world's highest). But have we already forgotten the behavior of the United States' banking, business and intelligence apparatuses toward the Allende government's attempts to make a Socialist state in Chile? Are our memories so short that we do not recall "destabilization," the blocking of normal credit, the strangling of export-import trade, and Kissinger's infamous "Track I" and "Track II"?

So Milton Friedman, the right-wing American economist, had his work cut out for him in trying to switch Chile onto still another track. But, as Jonathan Kandell points out in the March 21st *New York Times*, Friedman & Co. seem to be going about the switching on the basis of an altogether faulty assumption. These economists are acting as if Chile's economy were a textbook model of free private enterprise. Instead, it is stiff with monopolies and their administered prices, and Friedman's arcadian notions are bound not to work, either in the short run or the long.

The Chicago school's Track III heads nowhere for the people of Chile. It is just another form of oppression, made in the USA. Friedman & Co. are identified in the Chilean mind with the United States Government and so this country will be paying the price for the Chicago school's little experiments for years to come. There should be some way for the government in Washington to stop this destructive nonsense and send Friedman & Co. back to their classrooms in Chicago, where the damage they can do is only to sound economic theory, not human lives.

Lawman, Ph.D.

When Sheriff Harold Bray of Golden, Colo., was in the market recently for a deputy, he placed an ad in *Jobs in Philosophy*, and noted in the qualifications he would be looking for that "Ph.Ds. with specializations in classical and-or early modern philosophy" would be preferred, along with those having "well-developed competencies in the history of philosophy." Sheriff Bray told Edward B. Fiske of *The New York Times* that in his experience people with doctorates in philosophy have "the abilities

and expertise to understand changing times" that are necessary for a modern sheriff.

If that kind of understanding is an advantage to a lawman in Golden, it should be an even greater help to a policeman in a huge modern city, where breadth of vision and tolerance of diverse cultures would seem a prerequisite for the job. But just now in New York City the Board of Education contemplates abolishing the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and distributing its faculty and students among the other units of the city university system. At John Jay they teach not only law and the constabulary specialties but literature, history, sociology and the arts. On a spring afternoon you can see classes made up largely of police, firemen and other civil servants sketching the landscape of Central Park with watercolors, crayons and pastels. And not only cops and fire fighters but high school dropouts, unemployed youths, men and women from the minority groups that make up the polyglot population of the great city. It is not unusual to discover that the fellow sitting in class next to a member of New York's Finest has himself felt the hand of the law on his collar. They are learning about each other, which may in the end be more important than what the professor is teaching them.

The apartment of a woman we know was broken into last week by a thief who had jumped from a fifth-floor fire escape to the ledge of her bedroom window. When she and her husband came home, they called the police, and she remarked to the officer who came to look over the apartment her relief that none of the pictures on their walls had been touched. "Oh, lady," said the cop, "the kind of crook who risks his life jumping across air wells wouldn't know a Rembrandt from Mickey Mouse." The remark didn't bring them any closer to catching the thief, but it brought our friend closer to the police, reversing the process of estrangement between New Yorkers and their law-enforcement personnel that has for the past ten years or more been one of the most alarming symptoms of social deterioration in the city. Sheriff Bray is right and the Board of Education is wrong: New York cannot spare institutions like the John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Indeed, if the purpose of society is not to catch crooks but to prevent them, every major American city should have its John Jay.

FACE-OFF IN PANAMA

U.S. Imperialists, Old and New

PENNY LERNOUX

Panama City

Opposing camps of American imperialists face each other in Panama today, and if they do not resolve their basic dispute in the very near future, the tension they are creating will explode and seriously damage the diplomatic position and commercial interests of the United States, not only in Panama but throughout Latin America. Of these two colonies of Manifest Destiny, one occupies and operates the Canal Zone, remembering Teddy Roosevelt

and an era of military expansion, while the other, a complex community of multilingual executives, lives in Panama City and relies on technology and international finance to advance its imperial goals. Although the two views still sometimes coincide in the United States, they are fast diverging in Panama, for the sort of empire to which the Pentagon and the Zonians cling is in conflict with the aims of the multinationals.

Penny Lernoux is The Nation's Latin American correspondent.

Differences over empire building might have been postponed had a new Panama Canal treaty not become a hemispheric *cause célèbre*, but now that it is a priority issue in the Third World, the argument between business and the military has become shrill. Emotional appeals to patriotism notwithstanding, the real question in the ongoing controversy over a new treaty is whether the Canal is worth the multinationals' Latin American empire.

Henry Kissinger may be accused of a good many sins, but he is one of the few officials high in government to have realized just that. A cold pragmatist, as Kissinger believes he is, has no more patience with the contention of Sen. Strom Thurmond (R., S.C.) that the Panama Canal belongs to the United States because "we paid for it" than for the Panamanians' belief that the U.S.-run Canal Zone is an outdated colonial enclave. Both arguments miss the point that the Panama Canal is not a bilateral issue between Teddy Roosevelt's admirers and a frustrated banana republic but a test case for the United States in the uses of its power.

Kissinger is not the only one to have grasped the essentials in the dispute; Panama's strongman, Gen. Omar Torrijos, knows that the stakes are political and economic, not military. Although defense of the Canal remains one of the principal stumbling blocks in the seven-year-old negotiations to replace the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty governing the Panama Canal, both men are aware that there is no practical defense justification for stationing 10,000 soldiers at fourteen U.S. bases in the Canal Zone.

Since the Canal cannot be defended against nuclear attack or Panamanian guerrilla warfare, the only explanation for so many U.S. troops is that they constitute a strike force for intervention in some Latin American country. The last such invasion, of the Dominican Republic in 1965, cost the United States dearly in international good will. A repeat of that incident today would be political and economic folly, since not even the most right-wing Latin American military regime would stomach such Big-Stick tactics. Although Salvador Allende posed a far greater challenge than did the Dominican Republic's weak-willed Juan Bosch, there was never any serious question of military intervention in Chile because the State Department had come to see the wisdom of the multinationals' subtler tactics of economic pressure, propaganda and covert cooperation with the CIA.

Possibly because it is still nursing a cold-war hangover, the Pentagon has yet to comprehend this more complex form of U.S. intervention. And therein lies the danger for U.S. business. By refusing to compromise on the size and tenure of the U.S. military force in Panama, the Pentagon is jeopardizing the multinationals' Latin American operations. Saber rattling is considered unnecessary, uncouth and unwise in today's business world.

Thanks to Torrijos, what started as a bilateral dispute between a small Central American country and the hemisphere's northern giant has become the single most important issue in Latin America, with considerable potential for economic fallout. Castro's Cuba and Pinochet's Chile may agree on little, but they are as one on the question

of Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal. In a rare show of hemispheric solidarity, the Latin American bloc has given Panama its seat on the U.N. Security Council for the second time in six years. The gesture is a clear signal to the United States: if Washington wants its Latin American allies to vote with the United States, Washington would be well-advised to reach a compromise with Panama.

Political solidarity may be only a short step from some form of economic solidarity. There are many ways to bring pressure on Washington through the multinationals, such as the threat of nationalization, the effectiveness of which has been demonstrated by countries as diverse as Argentina and Peru. Another commonly used, though officially disapproved, method is the bombing of U.S. subsidiaries by left-wing students. At the very least, U.S. intransigence over a new treaty will contribute to a further cooling of relations, already strained by producer cartels, economic nationalism in Latin America and by Washington's failure to develop a new policy for the region.

While assiduously and successfully wooing Latin American support during the past three years, Torrijos has been careful to restrain any violent impulses among his own left-wing students. But if the lid ever blew in Panama, the United States would be confronted by more than the sort of guerrilla warfare Kissinger says he fears there. U.S. subsidiaries might be the target of "solidarity" bombings in other Latin American countries and the object of pressure by their governments. The local risk is high enough, Panama being the fifth largest U.S. investment in the region, but is as nothing compared to the total stake in Latin America which is the United States' second most important trading partner, after Canada, and accounts for its third largest foreign investment.

The fear of economic retaliation might never have been publicly voiced if the U.S. Congress had not thrown a spanner into the Canal talks last June by threatening to attach a rider to the State Department appropriations bill, cutting off funds for negotiations (the threat was never carried out). Although the Pentagon's Congressional supporters have always raised a hue and cry over any concession to Panama, the State Department misjudged the extent of their power to block a new treaty. Led by Rep. Daniel Flood (D., Pa.) in the House and Thurmond in the Senate, the pro-Pentagon forces mustered the support to convince thirty-nine Senators (five more than are needed to scuttle a treaty) and 246 Representatives to go on record last year as opposed to negotiations in any form. (The House must approve a new Panama treaty because a transfer of U.S. property is involved.)

The stop-the-talks campaign was based primarily on charges that the Panamanians are incapable of running the Canal (Flood says they "are not even garbage collectors") and that the Torrijos government is "up to the hilt with the Soviets," both of which are untrue. Nevertheless, feeling over the Panama Canal, that stupendous engineering feat of our younger days, runs so deep among some U.S. voters that President Ford's advisers

have warned him to avoid, in this election year, even lukewarm support of a new treaty.

Following the Congressional flap in June, the State Department hurriedly shifted its diplomatic attention from Panama to the United States. Ellsworth Bunker, former U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and the United States' chief negotiator in the Canal talks, was drafted to explain the historical background of the 1903 treaty to such important organizations as the World Affairs Council; the State Department has tried to do the same among influential U.S. legislators. Still, one must doubt that any of this explaining makes the least difference when so many Americans heed the misinformed viewpoint of Congressmen like Bill Alexander, (D., Ark.) who warns that "the next thing we know the Soviet Union is going to want Alaska back."

Ever since Teddy Roosevelt, the United States has ignored the fact that the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty did not actually give to the United States the 533-square-mile Zone but only the rights it would exercise *as if it were* sovereign. The \$10 million paid to Panama in 1903 was for treaty rights, not for territory, in contrast to the Alaska and Louisiana purchases. Nor did the treaty empower the United States to establish fourteen military bases in the Zone. Asking the public to accept these facts, which are quite unlike the facts they learned in school, is asking them to recognize another failure in the system for, here again, the United States is morally in the wrong. Who needs that sort of eyepener after Watergate and Vietnam?

But whatever the historical interpretation of the Panama Canal, there is one argument that will be listened to—how much the controversy may cost in dollars and cents. That is why the State Department, wisely if belatedly, enlisted U.S. business to help sell a new treaty to the American public. At the invitation of Sen. Gale McGee (D., Wyo.), the Senate's leading pro-treaty advocate, representatives of more than two dozen U.S. corporations met at the State Department last November to map out a public relations campaign. The Business and Professional Committee for a New Panama Canal Treaty was founded with an initial \$500,000 budget to act as a business lobby in Congress, its purpose being, in Senator McGee's words, to persuade the "wagglers, the premature commitments, the middle ground and [all those] who are not still riding up the hill with Teddy Roosevelt" that their opposition to a new treaty may have been hasty. "Too many people have committed themselves on this issue before understanding what it's all about." The business lobby "will have a good impact," says McGee, because the companies "will be taking the side of the liberals on what they consider a moral issue."

The companies, needless to say, are more concerned about what is good for business, which bombings and other anti-American demonstrations definitely are not. "The United States has raised the expectations of the Panamanians, and if we don't come up with some kind of revised treaty, we can expect an active response," said Kay R. Whitmore, first vice president and general manager of Kodak's Latin American operations. Many of the other corporations represented (Ford, Rockwell Inter-

national, Bank of America, Sears, Roebuck & Co., Pan American, Chase Manhattan, Bankers Trust Co., Gulf and Shell) have been the target of violence in Latin America, usually because of some unpopular U.S. action in the hemisphere.

"If we try to maintain the *status quo*, we will face mounting hostility in both Panama and Latin America—and the possible loss of the very interest we want to preserve," warned Ambassador Bunker. Failure to reach an understanding could "start a bonfire in the continent," added Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, one of the chief mediators in the U.S.-Panama dispute. A British-educated Bogotano who prides himself on his *sang-froid*, Lopez does not overestimate the danger. Were a bonfire to start, not only would the United States be acutely embarrassed by a nasty quarrel with its neighbors; it would also be courting the hostility of the only continent in the Third World that is still wedded to the capitalist system. And a showdown in Panama could wreck the incipient talks on world trade between First and Third Worlds, which would hardly please the Europeans or the Japanese who are much more dependent on the developing nations' raw materials than is the United States.

Unlike the Americans in the Zone, who not unnaturally relate everything to the Canal and the military bases, those employed in Panama are concerned about U.S. banking and commercial interests in Central America, the Caribbean and all of South America. Under the "Red" government of General Torrijos, Panama has replaced the Bahamas as the region's banker, its forty-five foreign banks having almost cornered the \$10-billion Latindollar trade, or approximately one-tenth the total of Eurodollars. Attracted by a freely convertible currency and lax banking laws, the international banking community has developed here a tropical Swiss haven, complete with numbered accounts. But while the deposits of wealthy Latin Americans comprise a sizable chunk of the banks' business, their primary function is to serve the multinationals that use Panama as headquarters for their triangular trade with Latin America.

To circumvent the limits many Latin American countries have placed on remittance of profits to the home company, the multinationals have established holding companies in Panama, which provide free-port privileges as well as a tax shelter. Goods are shipped from the parent company in the United States or Europe to its subsidiary in Panama, where the cost of the merchandise is invoiced at a higher price before being re-exported to some Latin American country—a process popularly known as *sobrefacturación*, or over-invoicing. By sending the goods through Panama, the parent company avoids tax payments on real profits in both the country of origin and the country where the goods are finally sold.

Panamanian subsidiaries also frequently hold the patents for the multinationals' Latin American investments, which means that royalty and fee payments can be reported in Panama instead of the United States or Europe. Royalties and fees collected by Panamanian holding companies often are higher than their subsidiaries' sales

profits, annual remittances on which are limited to 14 per cent of capital invested in such areas as the six Andean Pact countries. To complement its banking and trading facilities, Panama offers a haven for merchant vessels; more than 1,000 ships from the United States and Europe now fly the Panamanian flag. Although the Canal has encouraged the presence of foreign banks,



Vadillo, El Sol de Mexico

multinationals and shipping companies, it is the Torrijos government's *laissez-faire* policy toward international business that has allowed these interests to thrive here at the hub of the Americas.

While Torrijos may not be every businessman's ideal ruler, foreign executives agree that no other Panamanian politician could have exacted so much patience from his people during the prolonged negotiations over a new treaty. Since seizing power in 1968, the burly, 47-year-old general has managed an admirable balancing act between Populist and pro-business policies that has succeeded in keeping all but the old, power-hungry political parties in line, and he has seriously eroded their influence. Discredited even before the Torrijos regime as the tools of a few wealthy families, the political parties have been reduced to squabbling impotence by Panama's National Guard, a combination of police and armed forces, and by the technocrats and businessmen who have put a more up-to-date gloss on Panamanian politics.

Torrijos's regime is a dictatorship, but an easygoing

one by Latin American standards (torture is rare and the maximum punishment is exile). In any case, democratic ideals have never blossomed in the hothouse of Panamanian politics. Compared to the rigged elections, political corruption and constant coups that once characterized Panamanian politics, the Torrijos government appears stable and well-balanced. Torrijos has also "grown into a leader beyond the common variety of Latin American dictators," as a Panamanian university professor puts it, because of his success in uniting world opinion behind his people's aspiration to attain sovereignty over the Panama Canal.

Balancing the various interest groups in Panama is a difficult job, however, and that is something many U.S. Congressmen fail to recognize. Sweeping condemnations of Panama's military dictatorship, or its friendly relations with Cuba, do not take into account the internal situation or the eight years of stability that have allowed business to boom and treaty negotiations to progress. Torrijos is the first leader in Panamanian history to undertake some social and economic reforms for the benefit of the country's impoverished masses. He also has realized a long-standing ambition of his countrymen by buying out the banana interests of United Brands, the largest employer of agricultural labor in Panama. It may seem improbable that a government which supports the multinationals' triangular trade would also undertake social reforms or nationalize United Brands' holdings, but it is not far-fetched in Panama, where survival depends on a pragmatic approach to the demands of different pressure groups.

Torrijos has a very plausible reason for his friendship with Castro, since good relations with Cuba are crucial to his control over the country's left-wing students, who have been responsible for the overthrow of numerous governments in the past. He needs to avoid a clash between the students and the National Guard, for he knows from his own experience as a guardsman under previous governments how easily violence escalates in Panama, and violence would not advance the treaty talks.

Realizing that no treaty is possible until after the U.S. elections, Torrijos is prepared to use every possible tactic, including friendship with Castro, to keep the peace in Panama this year. Despite the obvious wisdom of this course, he has been criticized for it by U.S. Congressmen who have never questioned the relations of other Latin American countries with Cuba.

Not content to torpedo the Canal talks in Congress, right-wing groups in the United States are actively promoting Torrijos's overthrow. They have the blessing of Ronald Reagan, who sees the Canal as a useful issue in the struggle for the Republican nomination. As a result of this plotting, Torrijos faced the worst crisis in his eight-year-old government last January, when a group of right-wing Panamanian businessmen called a nationwide strike to set the stage for a comeback by Arnulfo Arias, a 75-year-old demagogue who has been President on three occasions and overthrown each time.

Exiled in Florida, Arias has gained the support of a number of right-wing U.S. organizations, including the John Birch Society. His chief spokesman is Phillip Harman, a 55-year-old California businessman and self-styled

"anti-Communist fanatic" who claims to be the "grandson-in-law of the founder of the Republic of Panama" and who recently added to his titles by becoming Reagan's adviser on Panamanian affairs. Since Reagan is not what you would call a Latin American expert, he relies heavily on Harman, repeating verbatim quotes from Harman's letters to denounce Washington's supposed sellout to the Panamanians.

For the time being at least, Arias has no hope of returning to Panama, no matter what Reagan says, for Torrijos is still strong enough to nip any *Arnulfista* conspiracy in the bud. The January strike fizzled under the joint pressure of the National Guard, which exiled eleven of the protesters, and Panamanian workers and students who threatened to occupy any business on strike. The events of January were also a lesson to anyone who aspires to succeed Torrijos. Public opinion is now so fixed on sovereignty over the Canal that any attempt to return to the country's old political ways of accommodating the United States generates immediate opposition from some of the country's most influential sectors, including the National Guard, students and workers. The question in Panama no longer is whether the country will regain sovereignty but how—whether through negotiations or violence.

Right-wing propaganda notwithstanding, Panama is not demanding the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops stationed in the Zone or the retirement of a single Zonian. What it really wants, in Bunker's words, are the "appurtenances of power," or the removal of the stigma of a nation divided in half by an enclave over which it has no control.

In an eight-point communiqué signed by Kissinger and Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Tack in 1974, it was agreed that perpetual U.S. sovereignty over the Canal Zone would be removed by a new treaty and that the two countries would review defense and administration of the Canal, the amount of land needed for Canal operations and the annual payment to Panama for the Canal's use, now a paltry \$1.9 million. Contrary to charges by Representative Flood that the eight principles were "an unconstitutional giveaway by faceless wonders in striped pants," the agreement was simply a starting point for negotiations that could no longer be postponed. Kissinger, no Santa Claus, signed the agreement because he knew the State Department could no longer fob off the Panamanians with a pretense of negotiations. Indeed, Torrijos caused such an international fuss over Washington's reluctance to engage in serious talks that the U.N. Security Council agreed to meet in Panama City to study the issue in 1973. Much to Washington's embarrassment, it was forced to cast one of the United States' rare vetoes against a Council resolution that urged the controversy be promptly settled by restoring sovereignty over the Canal to Panama.

Negotiations have since progressed to the point where agreement is possible on all but four issues. Three years after a new treaty goes into effect, the current Panama Canal Co. will be replaced by a jointly owned U.S.-Panamanian Co. Panama will assume administration of Zone

courts, police and postal services, and as Zonians retire Panamanians will gradually move into top technical and administrative positions. (Panamanians already occupy three-quarters of Canal-related jobs.) The two countries will also share responsibility for defense of the Canal.

Still to be settled are the number of U.S. military bases in the Zone, the duration of a new treaty, the Canal land to be returned to Panama and the amount of the annual payment. Reaching a compromise on these questions will not be easy because all four concern the Pentagon, which sees no reason why any concessions should be made.

Washington might agree to Panama's demand that the new treaty expire at the end of the century, provided Panama were willing to accept the presence of U.S. troops for at least another twenty-five years. But Panama is not willing. The U.S. troops are seen as an occupying army, and although Torrijos has warned his people that it is foolish to believe that Panama can force the hemisphere's most powerful country to decamp as soon as a treaty is signed, he also knows that he could end up in exile if he guaranteed U.S. military presence beyond the year 2000.

"No bases," which is painted on walls throughout the country, is obvious wishful thinking, as even student wall painters will admit. However, the government is demanding a reduction in the number of bases from fourteen to three and the removal of the hated School of the Americas, which has trained more than 25,000 Latin American military officers in "counterinsurgency techniques," a euphemism for the science of military dictatorship.

The Panamanians also want the return of 85 per cent of the Canal Zone lands, since much of this preserve serves no purpose but to prevent the natural growth of the country's two most important cities, Panama City and Colón, located on the Pacific and Atlantic sides of the Canal. The problem is that Zone property is considered symbolic, whether used or not. For example, when State Department officials suggested turning over two World War II airfields to the Panamanians to be used as customs sheds, they were warned not to try it since even so small a gesture to the Panamanians would be voted down as the "beginning of the giveaway" by pro-Pentagon forces in Congress.

These forces are equally adamant about any reduction of military bases although there is no strategic reason for them, and even Gen. George Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admits that a new treaty would be preferable to Panamanian sabotage. Actually, U.S. military presence in the Zone increases the likelihood of foreign attack, which is another reason why Torrijos wants U.S. troops to go home.

The Pentagon could argue that neutrality is not a deterrent to nuclear attack, but since the Canal is not neutral this is a moot point. Despite promises of "free, open and indiscriminate service," the U.S. Government stopped two merchant ships, one Russian and one Cuban, from entering the Canal after Chile's strongman, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, complained that the ships had failed to deliver cargo contracted for by the previous Allende regime. The Panamanians were outraged at such high-

handedness, not so much because it irritated the Soviets as because of the principle involved. By barring a foreign ship's passage through the Canal on political grounds, the United States places Panama in the position of facing possible reprisals for a foreign policy decision on which it was never consulted.

As for local sabotage, the Panamanians know that it is unnecessary to storm the Zone in order to close the Canal. One judiciously placed plastic bomb would do it. It is inexcusable to risk sabotage by delaying a new treaty when most U.S. aircraft carriers and warships are too large to squeeze through the Canal. "We have a multi-ocean navy which is not dependent on passageways such as the Canal," said Senator McGee. "We rely upon massive airlifts of personnel and equipment to facilitate a prompt and effective U.S. response to crisis." Said Carlos Lopez Guevara, one of the Panamanian negotiators, "If the Canal really were vital to the United States, we would not have a chance [of a new treaty]."

This is not to deny that the military gets good value from the Canal. Aircraft carriers may have outdated its strategic importance, but the Canal still saves the Pentagon a lot of money, even though that money rightly belongs to the Panamanian people. Since the Panama Canal Co. has not increased transit rates from the time the Canal was opened, it is in effect subsidizing world shipping. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America, an agency of the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council, had tolls been adjusted to reflect world prices, the Canal would have earned an additional \$2.6 billion between 1960 and 1970.

It happens that 70 per cent of the cargo passing through the Canal is en route to or from the United States and that a high percentage of this traffic is military. (Most of the supplies for the war in Vietnam were sent through the Canal.) Even the Zonians are beginning to wonder about Canal subsidies after all these decades. Having taken an \$8-million loss in 1975, the Panama Canal Co. has been forced to go on an austerity budget, and now there is talk of a strike by U.S. personnel.

The Zonians' frustration is nothing compared to that of the Panamanians who believe they are entitled to a better return on the country's only natural resource—its geographical position—and the reason why Teddy Roosevelt "took" Panama in the first place. But to date they have been stymied by the United States' refusal to increase transit rates and by the Panama Canal Co.'s peculiar bookkeeping system. If the company's accounts are to be believed, the Panamanians still owe \$317 million on the original \$386 million spent to construct the Canal. Panamanian economists, working with different sets of figures, assert that the cost was fully amortized in 1954 and that the Panama Canal Co. has juggled the books to keep figures in the red.

Whatever the real amortization figures, there can be no doubt that the United States has cheated the Panamanians on the rental of the military bases. "The United States pays \$2.3 million a year for the Canal and all the Zone lands, including fourteen military bases," said Panama's Archbishop Marcus McGrath. "Compare this with

the \$20 million a year the United States pays Spain for only three bases or Great Britain's annual payment of \$35 million for its bases in Malta."

Although Washington realizes that Panama is entitled to a higher rental, its top offer in the negotiations has been only \$25 million a year, which Panama refuses to accept.

Dependent on the Canal for 30 per cent of its gross national product and 40 per cent of its foreign earnings, Panama views the waterway as another Latin American nation would its mineral and oil resources. If these countries can demand and get better terms from the multinationals, including majority control of these resources, there is no reason why Panama should not expect similar treatment from the U.S. Government. The argument that the Canal would never have been built without U.S. money and know-how is as outdated as the multinationals' claim that but for them a region's natural resources could not have been developed. Nobody is arguing past history. What the Latin Americans say is that these companies have obtained more than good value from their investments, most of which were amortized long ago, and that goes for the Panama Canal as well as a copper mine or an oil well.

Another favorite cliché—that the Panamanians should be grateful to the United States because the Canal has given them the highest standard of living in Central America—washes no better. It is as logical as the multinationals' argument that they should be spared higher taxes and royalties because, by local standards, their workers are well paid. Both are economic *non sequiturs*. Annual per capita income in Panama is \$624, and nothing to boast about. Nor is there any reason why people who live well below the U.S. definition of the poverty level should subsidize the armed forces of the richest nation in the world.

Although these and other arguments have been discussed for the past seven years, none has altered the basic position of the Pentagon or its Congressional supporters. So it is left to the multinationals to champion the Panamanian cause, a role they may not relish but one that is necessary for modern empire building, political pragmatism being a more effective sales pitch than military threats. Certainly they are in a better position than most to know that when Ambassador Bunker talks about "the possible loss of the very interest we want to protect," he is not referring solely to the Canal but to the United States' considerable economic and political stake in all of Latin America.

Were the military to take a broader view of the Canal, it would also see that its intransigence could play into the hands of the very governments the Pentagon fears most. What we cannot understand, says Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez, is how the United States could be so foolish as to create another point of conflict in Latin America when "the Soviet Union already has one base in Cuba which is generating subversive ideas and actions in the whole region." Still, it wouldn't be the first time Washington drove the Latin Americans to extremes. □

WHY I SUPPORT JIMMY CARTER

REP. ANDREW YOUNG

Blacks have always known that our best allies are those Southern whites who have dared to live by their religious principles and who have been through the fire of persecution because of it. Northern liberals don't know how many such courageous souls there are. Only those who leave, either by choice or force, come to national attention. Tom Wicker, Chuck Morgan of ACLU, Bill Moyers and Willie Morris are widely recognized because they left, but there are many more who stayed and worked very effectively to deal with the problems of race and economic deprivation in our region.

Jimmy Carter left the South to complete his education and see the world in a Navy submarine, but he came back just as the turmoil of racial change erupted. A stubborn, independent spirit and a deep compassion enabled him to survive the moral contradictions exploding around him. He learned to love from his mother, one of the truly great women of our time. Southern women, whether black or white, have always been more free than the men.

The South has always been able to tolerate a few whites who were eccentric in their private lives and beliefs. It was only as you sought publicly to demonstrate your convictions that attacks came from white citizens.

Before he entered politics, Carter refused membership in the White Citizens Council. In his first elected office, he blocked the transfer of public school funds to segregated academies in Sumter County. His peanut warehouse suffered a brief boycott, but generally, he lived an independent, principled life through the 1950s and early 1960s. Jimmy's credentials are certainly as valid as a liberal voting record in the safety of the United States Congress.

I'm a romantic and an idealist, so it was very difficult for me to ignore such a moral and political success story. Admittedly, these alone do not qualify a man to be President of the United States. They do qualify him as a representative of the New South and a voice capable of ending the Wallace myth, which led politicians of both parties to turn to the Right. The principles of tolerance and fairness led me into a relationship with Jimmy Carter, but it is hard political reality that keeps me there.

In the primaries of recent weeks, first Florida, then Illinois and North Carolina ended up as battlegrounds with George Wallace. Only Jimmy Carter dared take him on in the conservative Florida panhandle. In 1972 Florida was the burying ground for progressive candidates, and a mood was set which Nixon exploited and which has dominated the nation for the past four years. Defeating Wallace in Florida had to be the number-one priority of any liberal strategy. The domestic agenda would be determined by the outcome.

Andrew Young is a Democratic member of Congress from Georgia.

Meanwhile, the Massachusetts primary had brought forth a new reality. Sen. Henry Jackson, exploiting the busing issue and the Moynihan "get tough" policy at the United Nations, and supported by the conservative wing of the AFL-CIO, put together a surprise victory there. The result was: (1) the demise of Birch Bayh, the liberal who had the best chance of beating Jackson in New York; (2) the resurgence of cold-war foreign policy and



a dangerous swing to the Right internationally; (3) the potential of a Jackson boom sweeping the big industrial states and creating a very negative national mood in both domestic and foreign policy; and (4) the possibility of a "private" deal with Wallace that would give Jackson the nomination and Wallace the influence behind the scenes, though not a place on the ticket. Jimmy Carter has the best chance to minimize Jackson's support in New York City, and his upstate and Long Island organizations might balance out the results on April 6.

In any event, the role of supporters is to provide insights and access to the voters, but the candidate himself

must win the votes. Jimmy Carter has found one key to the American mood. He has put together a well-organized and efficient campaign. He has demonstrated a capacity to reach a broad segment of the Democratic electorate, and especially black voters who make up more than 20 per cent of any national Democratic vote.

Carter grew up with black folk. Plains, Ga. has 300 white and 400 black citizens. He governed in a state with a 29 per cent black voting population. Fully one-third of the black professionals across the nation studied in the six institutions of higher education in Atlanta. Carter is a product of the Southern church and knows the language and culture of the black community. There are still more voting blacks in churches than in labor unions or political organizations. Jimmy Carter probably has more black staff than all the other candidates put together—not just organizing the black vote but keeping financial records and reporting to the Federal Elections Commission.

Any Democratic President must be able to reach black voters while not alienating middle America. Jimmy has done this quite successfully in Florida, Massachusetts and Illinois. He is perhaps the most electable of the Democrats in a race against Gerald Ford. There is a yearning for something different, as James Reston has pointed out, and as ninety-one new Congresspersons demonstrate. We must have a Democratic President in 1976. The nation could hardly survive four more years of Republican mismanagement and economic disaster. The difference between the Democratic candidates, except for Wallace, will be a matter of emphasis—quite an important difference, but not nearly as great as the gap between the parties.

Regardless of party, however, any President must cope with a Congress that is determined to share governmental power. There will be no more imperial Presidency. An overwhelmingly Democratic legislature will set the national program in the 95th Congress. We are not searching for ideas and programs; we are looking for effective administration and leadership from the executive branch. Full employment, national health insurance, tax reform and urban redevelopment will be the agenda for any Democrat in the White House.

Will Carter make a good President? Martin Luther King, Jr. was fond of quoting: "Greatness is characterized by antitheses strongly marked. A great man must be one with a tough mind and a tender heart." Jimmy Carter is such a man. He reads constantly, he listens and seeks advice from a variety of sources, then makes up his own mind. Once he's made up his mind, he's as tough as the proverbial Georgia Bulldog, though he went to Georgia Tech and the Naval Academy.

I remember flying in a helicopter down Georgia's Chattahoochee River with Jimmy Carter and Scoop Jackson and listening to Jimmy, who was Governor then, discuss environmental issues with Scoop. He not only held his own but took Scoop on in energy questions as well. Jimmy is like that. He sized up all the Presidential prospects who came through Georgia while he was Governor, and decided they didn't know any more than he

did and that he could outwork any of them. So why not run for President? The early primaries have proved that he may have been right.

As Governor he did not shrink from challenges. He tried to anticipate them and head off crises. He brought in consultants from M.I.T. to help with governmental reorganization, and hired a young prison reformer from Connecticut to do something about Georgia's archaic prisons (the system was so bad it gave the newcomer a heart attack in six months). Carter was the first Georgia Governor to show publicly his respect for blacks and organized labor in state politics. Prior to his administration, the state's conservative mood viewed open contacts with labor and blacks as fatal to a politician's career in Georgia. Carter addressed the state AFL-CIO annual dinner and worked to end the "waiting week," which was required before workers could receive unemployment compensation.

Perhaps the most significant thing he did was to deputize every high school principal in the state as a voting registrar. This meant that registration was easy and accessible in all of Georgia's 159 counties for blacks and whites alike. (By contrast, Lyndon Johnson sent federal voting referees to only 106 Southern counties, most of them in Alabama and Mississippi. Nixon never used federal power to protect minority voting rights.) The new participation in Georgia politics owes a lot to Jimmy's executive initiative. He was so successful that he almost lost out as a delegate to the 1972 convention. A black college student came within fifteen votes of beating him.

The toughest battles of his administration were on environmental issues. If you judge by the behavior of Georgia's Congressional delegation or state legislature, you might decide there is little or no political gain to be found in fighting to protect the environment. Yet Jimmy confronted the Corps of Engineers, the real estate lobby and the highway and construction lobbies which have dominated Georgia politics for half a century. He mobilized enough citizen support to win on several key environmental issues in the state. Whenever there was a choice of avoiding a challenge, compromising an issue or battling head-on, he invariably chose to fight. That attitude does much to explain both his success and his many enemies in Georgia. Carter is a stranger to liberal rhetoric and ideology. He is an engineer and farmer. He may even deny the liberal formulas which come from Ivy League colleges and liberal arts education. But his heart is right, his instincts are sound and his training is very practical. He is not much on analysis of problems and debate on issues, but he does solve problems. He defies labeling. His appeal is intensely personal, not ideological. He starts with the problems of people and works to discover effective and efficient solutions.

There will be a lot of close scrutiny of Jimmy Carter. He asks for it and seems to have built a campaign on the question of character. Cynics are both intrigued and offended by this. My bet is that he'll come through; perhaps a bit bruised and scarred by it all, but nevertheless unbowed. □

BUDGET TIME AT THE PENTAGON

REP. LES ASPIN

It's said that Chicago is a baseball town and that Green Bay goes for football. But the game they play in Washington is the numbers game.

Right now, it being budget time, the numbers are being lined up by the Pentagon to show that America is slipping into the number-two position, with the Soviet Union opening up a wide lead in the international military league. There are two prongs to the argument: the Soviets are outspending us on defense, and they are outproducing us in weapons.

Take the first point, spending. Yesterday's missile gap has become today's dollar gap. The core of this argument is that, in terms of the dollar, the Soviets are now spending 40 per cent more than the United States on defense, and when pensions are stripped away, the Soviet lead mounts to 50 per cent. That is an accurate statistic. But very few ever notice the caveat buried in that sentence—"in terms of the dollar." The Soviets, of course, do not spend dollars. Their ruble outlays and our dollar outlays must be put in comparable terms.

But since the ruble is not traded on international currency markets, there is no accepted rate of exchange. The solution used by the intelligence community is to calculate how many dollars the American taxpayer would have to pay to duplicate the Soviet armed forces, lock, stock and rifle barrel. The CIA calculates that if the United States were to buy the Soviet armed forces in the United States at U.S. prices, it would have cost us \$114 billion last year. By comparison, we spent \$80 billion on our own forces.

But look behind the statistics. A new recruit in the U.S. Army gets more than \$83 a week, while a Soviet recruit gets less than a ruble a week. By computing the payroll costs of the Soviet armed forces at U.S. military wage scales, we discover a \$50-billion Soviet payroll that exists only in the Pentagon's imagination. The absurdity of this calculation is obvious: if Congress voted to cut U.S. salaries back to the pre-volunteer Army pay rates, the Soviet military "budget" would plummet overnight.

This "dollar comparison" is only one way to look at Soviet spending. Another is the "ruble comparison"—that is, how much it would cost the Russians to buy our armed forces in their economy. A new ruble comparison is now underway in our intelligence community. Precise figures are not yet available, but based on previous studies and on new information indicating that the Russians are more inefficient than we had believed, the calculations are likely to stand in stark contrast to the dollar comparison.

The reason for the discrepancy is that the cost of resources is different in the two countries. Wage scales are low and technology comes high in the Soviet Union, so Moscow uses more manpower than sophisticated equip-

ment. The reverse is true in the United States. When we figure the cost of the Soviet military in the United States, our generous pay scale biases the dollar cost of their vast manpower upward. And when we figure the cost of American forces in the Soviet Union, their inefficient factories bias the ruble cost of our technology-intensive forces upward. In short, it would cost each country a great deal more than is actually spent to build the other fellow's armed forces.

But even the soon-to-be-published estimate of ruble expenditures will understate our defense expenditures, since it ignores the technology gap between U.S. and Soviet defenses. Many of the fancier items in the American arsenal are beyond the capabilities of Soviet factories—the TV-homing, steerable bomb, for example. So the estimates show the cost in rubles of the closest thing the Russians have—in this case, an ordinary iron bomb. If we count what it would actually cost the Russians to produce more advanced American equipment, the total ruble cost of the American military is far greater than the Soviet military budget.

So the first point to be made about the Pentagon's argument is that it cites only the dollar comparison and thus biases the case against the United States. But even using dollars, the calculations conveniently leave out the fact that if there is a war in Europe, it won't just be a face-off between Russia and the United States. According to the respected International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, our NATO allies (including France) spent \$61 billion on defense last year, while Moscow's junior partners in the Warsaw Pact spent \$8 billion.

When the figures are totaled up, it turns out that NATO outspent the Warsaw Pact last year by \$141 billion to \$122 billion—even when we use the dollar calculation that exaggerates Soviet spending. If we used a ruble calculation, the Western lead would be positively devastating.

The spending gap is not the only cause for alarm unearthed recently. The administration has also been pressing its contention that Soviet weapons production surpasses our own. Pentagon charts are very popular in the press these days. One that is frequently seen shows that we lead the Russians only in the production of helicopters. The charts compare the average Soviet production in the three-year period, 1972-74, with American production in the same period. (See Table I.)

This shows, for example, that in the important area of tanks, the Russians have outproduced us 3,000 to 462, giving Moscow a 6.5-to-1 advantage. But take a look at what the charts do not show:

¶That American production has been low for years because the U.S. Army was satisfied that it had enough tanks.

¶That after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War the Army decided the high loss rates of such warfare required it to have more tanks, that Congress agreed, and that tank

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production will be almost tripled by 1977, when the United States will turn out 1,203.

¶That our allies produced as many tanks as we did in 1972-74, while Russia's allies produced a grand total of zero. (See Table II.)

TABLE I: The Pentagon's Chart

U.S./USSR RELATIVE PRODUCTION RATE ESTIMATES

	U.S. 1972-74 AVG	USSR 1972-74 AVG	USSR/U.S. 1972-74
	462 ¹	3,000	6.5:1
	860	4,400	5:1
	170	1,200	7:1
	920	710	1:1.3
	540	930	1.7:1
	0	10	
	3	5	1.7:1
	11	39	3.5:1
	0	6	

¹ INCLUDES 475 M60A2 RETROFIT IN 1973-74.
AVERAGE M60A1 PRODUCTION WAS 303/YEAR

TABLE II: Nato vs. Warsaw Pact

Category	Alliance	1972-1974			
		Average	1975	1976	1977
Tanks	Nato	910	1200	1280	1780
	Pact	3000	2200		
Armored Personnel Carriers	Nato	1460	2330	4010	4250
	Pact	4700	3300		
Artillery	Nato	320	360	580	600
	Pact	1300	1700		
Helicopters	Nato	1100	370	350	400
	Pact	710	765		
Tactical Planes	Nato	820	825	850	830
	Pact	930	960		
Bombers	Nato	0	0	0	0
	Pact	10	24		
General Purpose Submarines	Nato	11	5	8	9
	Pact	6	5		
Surface Ships (250-plus tons)	Nato	19	24	25	25
	Pact	14	12		
Ballistic Missile Submarines	Nato	1	0	1	0
	Pact	6	6		

Figures provided in the table are based on several sources, including unclassified Defense Department data; The Military Balance, several years, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies; Jane's Yearbooks; SIPRI Yearbooks and other unpublished data.

¶That 1,250 Russian-made tanks met a rather inglorious end in the Sinai in 1973 and are no longer a threat to anyone but shoeless Bedouins who may cut themselves on the metal splinters.

¶That we have, in the Pentagon's own words, a significant superiority in anti-tank weapons—the kinds that helped cause the Sinai losses.

¶That Soviet tank production last year was substantially lower than its average 3,000 of the previous three years.

We cannot know what Soviet tank production will be in the years ahead. It is logical to assume it will exceed NATO's, perhaps by one-third, but in no way as dramatic as the lead commonly shown in the charts. The Russian lead will continue to be offset in part by NATO's immense lead in anti-tank weapons—an item mysteriously missing from the charts.

Armored Personnel Carriers is another area where the Russians are shown to have a dramatic lead. (APCs are designed to carry a squad of troops into battle behind substantial steel protection.) But while going over the details of the Soviet APC production, I learned that only half the figures shown are for the new, first-line Soviet armored personnel carrier. In fact, part of the alleged APC production actually covers scout cars, which are little more than heavy jeeps.

Almost everything said about tank production is true of APC production:

¶Our allies produced twice as many APCs as Russia's Warsaw Pact allies in the 1972-74 period.

¶U.S. and NATO production is soaring and is expected to triple by 1977, compared to the 1972-74 average production.

¶Soviet production dropped substantially in 1975, and unless it picks up will be far below NATO production this year and next—even including those scout cars.

One of the perennial favorites of numbers aficionados has been Soviet ship production. As the Pentagon's chart shows, the Soviets outproduced us 3.5 to 1 in the 1972-74 period. And they did indeed outproduce us if one counts every dinghy and tugboat to come out of their shipyards. But as for major surface combat ships (carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates), each superpower averaged about five a year in 1972-74.

One can take a broader view than the Pentagon and make two changes in their chart: first, count only those ships larger than 250 tons (thus excluding dinghies but still counting many small Soviet vessels as equal to our 95,000-ton carriers); and second, add the warships produced by the allies of both sides. The count then shows that NATO averaged nineteen ships a year to the Warsaw Pact's fourteen during the 1972-74 period. And last year NATO outproduced the Pact twenty-four to twelve. Thus, with a little refinement, the Soviet lead of 3.5 to 1 becomes a Western lead of 2 to 1.

Right now the numbers argument is focusing on Russian spending and weapons production. For the past few years, however, the emphasis has been on missile statistics. Those who felt America was playing Avis to the Russian

Hertz cited the Soviet lead in numbers of missiles, 2,402 to 1,710.

However, we have many more warheads on our missiles and we have many more bombers. Altogether the United States can hit the Soviet Union with 8,500 nuclear weapons, while the Soviets have only 2,800 at their disposal. So even in the realm of missile *macho* numbers, the United States still ranks number one.

Again, look behind the numbers. For the purpose of deterring the Russians, all that matters is how many of our weapons would survive an all-out Soviet attack. Suppose the Russians launched a devastating assault and destroyed 90 per cent of our land-based missiles, 80 per cent of our B-52 bombers and half of our submarines—which is far beyond Soviet capabilities now or in the foreseeable future. Soviet military planners would have to contend with the fact that we would still have 3,100 surviving warheads—10 per cent more than the Soviet pre-attack arsenal! That is enough to drop thirteen nuclear weapons on every Russian city of more than 100,000 people.

Washington officialdom feels more at home with quantity comparisons because numbers exude precision. The trouble with the production numbers—including the ones I've presented—is that they assume one Soviet tank equals one American tank. But Russian tanks can't fire as rapidly as American tanks, they are less accurate at long range, and the steel armor protecting the crew is thinner. Furthermore, the crew space is so cramped that according to one report the Russian tank corps will accept no one taller than 5' 7". Soviet tankers have something else to worry about: their tanks carry extremely vulnerable external fuel tanks when traveling long distances. In effect, every Russian tank comes with its own Molotov cocktail as standard equipment.

Numbers have some relevance for comparing the two navies, but numbers don't sink the enemy; fire power does that. Just one of this nation's giant aircraft carriers contains more explosive power in terms of bombs and missiles than all the fire power on all the ships of the Soviet fleet of 1,000 tons or more. That is not a plea for a one-carrier navy, but if five of their ships should face three of our ships in a war, those numbers won't decide the issue any more than they did in the Pacific during World War II. The decision will go to the force with superior tactics, fire power, speed, maneuverability and the ability to sustain a high level of damage and keep fighting. That last factor may sound mundane, but the U.S. Navy was at a disadvantage early in World War II partly because shipboard fires got out of control, while Japanese seamen were better able to confine and extinguish fires.

Besides the quality difference between the weapons of the United States and the USSR there is a difference in what the two countries are doing with their forces. Neither superpower has ever intended that its forces should be a carbon copy of the other's. The roles of our military services are similar but not the same. The Russians, for example, have stationed 500,000 men along the Chinese border, where they are no threat to us. A lot of their weapons production also goes to the Chinese border. In

theory these forces could be moved to Europe in the event of war there, but in practice Moscow wouldn't dare move them as long as the Sino-Soviet split is a reality; the likeliest time for a Chinese attack would be precisely when Russia's forces were engaged elsewhere.

The United States scaled down its force planning a few years ago when it switched from a two-and-one-half war strategy to a one-and-one-half war strategy—that is, planning to fight one major war and one minor war simultaneously. With the Sino-Soviet split, it appears that Moscow must alter its planning from a one-war strategy to a two-war strategy. In that context, a Soviet build-up in men and equipment is neither surprising nor necessarily a cause for Pentagon alarm.

The forces on the Chinese border aren't the only non-threatening elements of the Soviet military. Fear for internal security has given the Soviet leadership a permanent wince and led it to devote 430,000 men, or about 10 per cent of its troops, to that role and border protection. Every Soviet ship has a political officer aboard to make sure that when the vessel turns to starboard it does it the Marxist way. About 5 per cent of the Russian officer corps is comprised of such political commissars who contribute nothing to military effectiveness.

The Soviets also have several divisions' worth of construction troops. They appear to be the washouts from basic training who are kept in uniform for the remainder of their conscription service. Furthermore, many of the administrative chores handled by uniformed Soviet servicemen are assigned to civilians in the United States. As a result, we deceive ourselves (or are deceived by others), if we look at the raw figures showing the Soviet Union with twice as many men in uniform and envisage a Red horde about to descend on civilization.

All of these numbers—the manpower numbers, the production rates, the spending totals—are important in only one respect. They relate to the debate going on in Congress over the size of the U.S. defense budget for next year. To be sure, Russian defense forces are something that must be taken into account when planning U.S. defense budgets. And to be sure the Russians do have a formidable force which has been growing. Over the past decade Soviet defense expenditures have increased by about 2.7 per cent per year. After subtracting the resources going to the Chinese border, internal security or other nonthreatening areas, only about half that increase falls in areas primarily threatening to the United States.

The Congress should not rubber-stamp the administration's \$113.8-billion defense request for next year. That would be a 6 per cent increase over this year's budget after discounting for inflation, and in the important procurement and research accounts—the weapons funds—it is a 22 per cent increase after inflation. I hope the Congress will not let itself be stampeded.

The Pentagon falls all over itself seeking new superlatives with which to crown the Soviets. The Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. David C. Jones, recently went so far as to say, "Not since Germany's rearmament in the 1930s has the world witnessed such a single-minded emphasis on military expansion by a major power."

The General's remarks remind me of the parents who

try to frighten their offspring into obedience with tales of the monsters that gobble up children who don't do as they are told. I hope the public will not fall prey to such tactics. We must have a rational defense policy, and it

will only ensue from a rational defense debate. The debate will not be rational so long as it is anchored to a collection of fairy tales and an array of allegedly "firm" numbers that are more deceptive than illuminating. □

TARGET FOR SLANDER

THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM

DAVID TABACOFF

"A haven for welfare chiselers"; a "federal scholarship for affluent college students." The food stamp program has been under attack from the Right since its inception fifteen years ago, but only in the last two has it become the target of such slanders as these. President Ford in his State of the Union message described the program as "scandal-riddled," and he, along with other politicians who share his conservative views, are now proposing legislation that could cut food stamp aid in half.

Food stamps provide varying degrees of assistance to approximately 18 million recipients. Except for some administrative costs borne by the states, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) picks up the tab for the nearly \$5-billion program. Families on public assistance are automatically eligible for food stamps, but a household not on welfare must meet income and asset standards set by the federal government. Most families must buy into the program by purchasing coupons. How much a family has to pay depends on its size and its net monthly income after deductions. (Deductions can be made for excessive medical bills, housing costs and certain other large expenses.) A family of four may receive stamps free if its deductions are very substantial and its income low. Or it may pay as much as \$142 for stamps with a face value of \$166.

Until recently, liberals were among the strongest critics of the food stamp program. They protested that complex administrative procedures and the confusing system of itemized deductions discouraged the neediest families from participating. They maintained that as many as 20 million Americans who were eligible for food stamps did not choose to apply. And data from the Bureau of the Census indicate that more than half of those with incomes below the poverty line do not participate in the program.

But with the recession and the approach of the 1976 elections, conservatives became even more critical of the program than the liberals had been, charging that it is too generous. They evidently hope to capitalize on popular resentment against what is seen as excessive federal spending for welfare. Indeed, their offensive against food stamps is in some ways similar to their assertion that New York City collapsed financially under the weight of the social services it supplied to its less fortunate residents.

Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, reluctant to the last to support a federal bailout of any kind for New York, has charged that the food stamp program is so

wildly out of control that almost anyone can qualify. New York's Conservative Sen. James Buckley, one of the most implacable critics of the program, says "Enough is enough. . . . There is literally no limit to the ways the taxpaying public can be exploited through the food stamp program."

To combat what they describe as a wasteful federal boondoggle, Senator Buckley and Republican Rep. Robert Michel of Illinois introduced legislation in Congress last year that aims to drop 9 million recipients from the food stamp rolls. A similar bill has been submitted by President Ford. His proposal has received the active support of the government official entrusted with administering the program, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, who says that the American people are "fed up" with the way the program has been run.

Objections to the food stamp program by conservatives of both parties can be reduced to three main points: food stamps are being used by people who don't need them, including affluent working families; the food stamp program is too large; and there is a high rate of fraud in the program. According to Senator Buckley, his legislation aims to end "the national scandal of allowing affluent families to literally live off the labor of those who must work for their daily bread."

But the USDA's own figures dispute such charges. According to the Agriculture Department, there are almost no families, of whatever size, participating in the program whose incomes exceed \$10,000. Only 13 per cent of all food stamp recipients are in households with incomes above \$6,000. In fact, 93.5 per cent of participating four-person households (the family size most often used by the government for comparative purposes) take in less than \$6,000 a year.

In 1975, the poverty line for a family of four was about \$5,000, but the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which measures the cost of living for various income levels, has estimated that a "lower budget" plan (one devoted almost entirely to basic necessities) would cost a family of four \$7,200 a year. The facts suggest, then, that nearly all four-person households on the food stamp rolls live either below the poverty line or scarcely above it.

David Tabacoff, who does research for a network news organization, was until recently a researcher-writer for a consumer group, his area of concentration being the problems of the low-income elderly.

The conservative critics of the program also charge that many participants in the program are "affluent" workers, but the statistics suggest that most recipients aren't in the labor market at all. Nearly 20 per cent are retired people living on fixed incomes, while 50 per cent are not even seeking employment. Many in that category are female heads of households between the ages of 18 and 34. Ten per cent are unemployed but seeking work. Only 23 per cent of those in the program were employed full- or part-time, and many of them were unskilled and poorly paid.

Secretary Simon has come up with the most unusual figure to prove that the food stamp program is too large. He claims that, since 1962, the program has grown by 47,000 per cent. The figure is correct, but Simon fails to point out that in 1962 only eight counties in the whole country participated in the food stamp program. In those days, the major federal mechanism for feeding the poor was the Commodity Distribution Program. In 1962, nearly 8 million Americans received surplus food under that scheme.

But Commodity Distribution, which gave surplus food directly to low-income families at designated sites, was cumbersome, more a depression-style relief program than an income-support system. In the mid-1960s, the government decided it ought not to be in the food distribution business; that it would be more efficient if clients could buy food in the normal way at the retail store. The USDA instituted the food stamp program, and as it grew Commodity Distribution was discontinued.

Probably the most serious charge made by conservative critics is that the stamp program is an easy target for chiselers. Says Buckley: "Shocking federal regulations have turned a worthy and humane food stamp program into an administrative nightmare and a public rip-off. They contain more loopholes than a moth-eaten fishnet."

Since, under current regulations, people on public assistance automatically qualify for stamps, whatever fraud takes place within that group stems from each state's welfare system, not from the food stamp program. Among households that aren't on public assistance, the USDA has calculated the error rate (that is, the percentage of ineligible families receiving food stamps) to be about 17 per cent. That is the figure used by those who hope to discredit the program, but 17 per cent is the *error* rate, not the *fraud* rate.

According to the Community Nutrition Institute, a nonprofit organization that monitors government programs, there are many reasons for the high rate of error. For example, procedural mistakes are made by caseworkers trying to determine eligibility on the basis of complex regulations. Indeed, half of the 17 per cent figure was calculated to be comprised of people who were in fact eligible for food stamps but who had been declared ineligible because their work registration cards were in the wrong file. (All recipients under 65 and able to work must have a card on file indicating their availability for employment.) When these and other errors due to technicalities are discounted, the error rate falls to between 5 per cent and 8 per cent of nonwelfare clients.

The USDA estimates that the actual percentage of food stamp recipients who knowingly defraud the government is less than 1 per cent. For comparison, the government estimates that the fraud rate for professionally prepared income tax returns is greater than 16 per cent.

Although the realities of the food stamp program are a good deal less shocking than conservative critics pretend, they continue to urge drastic cuts. Both the Buckley-Michel and Ford legislation call for dropping all but the poorest citizens from the program by using the Office of Management and Budget definition of poverty as the bench mark for eligibility. But while the Ford bill provides a standard deduction of \$100 a month for all households (and an additional deduction of \$25 a month for households with a member older than 60), the Buckley-Michel bill allows no deductions except for \$25 a month to households with a member over 65.

The obvious argument is that, if it used the poverty line as the eligibility criterion, the program would continue to serve those who really need the assistance, but weed out those who don't. However, many poor families whose incomes are above the poverty line but below the cost estimate of the government's own "Lower Budget" would be eliminated.

In addition, many observers believe that the poverty line does not accurately gauge the effects of inflation on low-income families. At present, the poverty line is tied to changes in the Consumer Price Index, which is based on an average family's expenses. But a poor family spends a greater portion of its income on the basics—food and shelter—than does the average family. The 1974 report of the National Nutrition Policy Study to the Senate Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs concluded that "the poverty line is particularly unresponsive to rapid rises in food and shelter costs—two items that alone comprise approximately two-thirds of a poor family's budget."

Both proposed bills would also require participants in the program to spend 30 per cent of their net income on food stamps. Since almost no deductions are allowed under the Buckley-Michel bill, the effect would be particularly devastating to currently eligible families, who spend 16 to 24 per cent of their net income on stamps. President Ford attempted to impose a similar spending requirement, but strong Congressional opposition forced him to back down. Now, however, Congressional support for the food stamp program has been eroded by the right-wing drumbeat about welfare cheats and chiselers. And Congressional mail is reported to have been strongly in favor of a cutback.

Perhaps the most damaging feature of the two conservative proposed bills has received the least attention in the press. Both include provisions for supervision over those who get food stamps so strict that they threaten basic civil liberties. Under the Ford proposal, recipients would be required to have photo-identification cards and to countersign food stamps both at the issuance office and at the retail food store. The Buckley-Michel bill goes even further—it would require the photo-identification card to include the left and right thumbprints of the recipient. At present, food stamp clients carry a simple identification card that attests to eligibility and includes name and address.

Supporters of the proposed changes argue that such administrative requirements would make it more difficult to defraud the government, but such "identity cards" would also encourage the overwhelming majority of honest food stamp recipients to leave the program. Forced to sign their food stamps at the cash register, required to show an identification card, with photo and fingerprints, upon the demand of a food-store manager, the person using food stamps would no doubt become an object of suspicion.

Of course, Buckley and his allies want to make the food stamp program as unattractive as possible. Along with other provisions that would tighten asset allowances, legislation such as that submitted by Ford, Buckley and Michel would restrict food stamps to only the very poorest citizens. And those who remained in the program would be expected to eat humble pie.

While conservative politicians have been devising ways to reduce the food stamp program, public-interest activists have been working to improve its benefits. A 1975 suit by the Food and Research Action Center resulted in a court ruling that the government must find a way to determine food stamp allotments that will provide recipients with a nutritionally adequate diet.

Before the court ruled, the USDA had based food stamp allotments on the cost of what it called the "economy food plan." That plan had come under increasing criticism from some nutritionists, who declared that as a scale for allocations it provided most recipients with an inadequate diet. The most damaging evidence came from the USDA itself. In a study made in 1965 and 1966, the department found that a family eating according to the "economy plan" had less than a 10 per cent chance to maintain a good diet, and only a 50 per cent chance for a fair one.

As required by the court, the USDA has introduced a new food plan, called the "thrifty food plan," which costs about the same as the "economy food plan" and, according to the Food Research and Action Center and other critics, doesn't significantly improve the food stamp recipient's prospects for a decent diet. The USDA itself admits that the "thrifty" plan does not provide 100 per cent of the Recommended Daily Allowance (RDA) of two important nutrients, vitamin B6 and magnesium. And, in order for the plan to provide enough iron in the diet of youngsters and young women, the USDA has assumed that the higher iron enrichment levels for bread and flour proposed by the Food and Drug Administration will be adopted. There are other drawbacks to the "thrifty food plan." Catherine Cowell, director of the New York City Bureau of Nutrition, in comments submitted to the USDA, noted its emphasis on fats and sugars, and declared it "nutritionally unsound and contrary to all education materials used in teaching the medical professional, nutritionists and dieticians."

Some sort of reform is necessary if the program is to encourage those in need to participate, and if it is to guarantee them a nutritionally adequate diet. Congress

is beginning to stir in the matter. A bill submitted by Sens. Robert Dole (R., Kans.) and George McGovern (D., S. Dak.) would eliminate the requirement that food stamp recipients pay substantial amounts of cash for their stamps. Should such a provision become law, a family of four now paying \$142 in cash for \$166 in food stamps would pay nothing and receive \$24 in stamps.

Secretary Butz, in a statement before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, explained why the administration bill did not contain such a feature: "Eliminating the requirement that participants pay for their food stamps would be a major departure from the original objective of the program. Distribution of stamps in only bonus amounts would change that objective to one of pure income supplementation." He expressed fear that stamp recipients would use the remaining cash for non-food purchases, instead of on a more nutritious diet.

But liberals argue that this reform would make food stamps more easily available to those in need. A number of studies indicate that many low-income families stay out of the program because they are unable to accumulate the large amounts of cash needed to buy the stamps. By eliminating the purchase requirement, the program could begin to attract those who need it the most. Organizations like the Community Nutrition Institute in Washington, D.C. also point out that, if the purchase requirement were dropped, stamp distribution would be simplified and administrative costs reduced. Indeed, it has been estimated that the government would save \$3 billion a year in the printing, distributing and redemption of food stamps.

Like the Ford and the Buckley-Michel bills, the McGovern-Dole bill would replace itemized deductions with one standard deduction. But the McGovern-Dole bill offers more generous terms than do the others—\$125 a month plus \$25 a month for households with an elderly member. Such a reform would greatly simplify the certification procedure and ease the load on caseworkers, thus reducing the possibility of error.

The most liberal food stamp reform bill before Congress has been submitted by Sen. Jacob Javits (R., N.Y.) and co-sponsored by Sens. Philip Hart (D., Mich.) and Edward Brooke (R., Mass.). It, too, would eliminate the purchase of stamps, but would grant a larger standard deduction—\$135 a month plus an additional \$25 for households with an elderly member—and an additional \$30 for working households. This last provision would replace the itemized deductions currently allowed working families for work-related expenses and child care. Neither the Javits nor the McGovern-Dole bill would alter the current method for determining eligibility ceilings or mandate a specified food plan as a basis for food stamp allotments.

The legislation submitted by Javits, Hart, Brooke, McGovern and Dole is not the final answer to the problems of malnutrition in the United States. Indeed, their proposals only begin the drive to make the food stamp program more efficient and more responsive to Americans who face malnourishment because of low income. But the option represented by the Buckley-Michel and Ford proposals is another in a continuing campaign to turn the federal government away from the needs of the poor and disadvantaged. □

BOOKS & THE ARTS

Distinguished by the Sparrow's Visit

RONALD SAMPSON

Ruskin's well-known diagnosis of the disease consuming Western man suggested that we had but two essential aims in life: "Whatever we have, to get more; wherever we are, to go somewhere else." Since then another century has gone by and the disease has become very much worse. It is a truism to say that modern man is alienated, but alienated from what? From his true self. But what is his true self? His most signal characteristic is his fear that if he ceases for a moment in his feverish activity, he will not get anywhere. But when one inquires where he wants to get to, one waits in vain for a clear answer. There is no tranquillity because repose derives from communication with abiding things, and that we have lost. To seek God, to deepen the soul's understanding, to commune with the silence of Nature and the serenity of the beasts of the field, to relate to people at a profounder spiritual level represent values not characteristic of our culture. What is in evidence is a ceaseless and restless search for more money, faster transport, more distant vacations, a striving for status and hierarchical advancement, more possessions, more power, coupled with intense and widespread fears of crime, terror, assassination, death or mutilation on the roads, the collapse of family life, the spread of mental loss of balance and overall the threat of war, even of nuclear war.

Let us look at a few examples of the contradiction between what we do and what would reasonably suggest itself as a way of reducing the evils flowing from what we do. Consider the arms race, sustained by fear and the struggle for power. It might be thought self-evident that society would be doing everything to encourage all individuals to seek ways and means of overcoming these powerful emotions within themselves, and thus reduce the climate of fear and tension now prevailing. Instead, any genuine disarmer is immediately called upon to explain with what he would replace the present "protection" allegedly afforded by the extant "balance" of terror. That question is of course de-

signed to silence him, which it generally does, since of course it is impossible for anyone to foresee how institutional changes will occur when our present culture and values will have been transformed.

Or consider the question of transport. Modern transport (excluding the ultimate nightmare of supersonic aircraft) is now available to a majority of the population for their private use at a cost impossible to compute in lives killed, mutilated and injured, in the destruction of the countryside, in the pollution of the air, in the impossibility of fellowship with people met on the highway whence people, horses, bicycles have been virtually banished, in shattered peace and lacerated nerves. The remedy is for people to cultivate in themselves values which would lead them to reject the alleged advantages of speed and convenience brought at such a dreadful price. But instead we discuss only palliatives such as ring roads, foreign import quotas, seat belts, which do nothing to alleviate the ever worsening chaos of the roads.

Instead of facing up to the contradiction between the way in which we live and the demands of a reasonable life we accept the contradiction as inevitable and seek a variety of opiates, irrespective of the cost, in the hope of stupefying the conscience and dulling the pain. The most lurid and pathological of recent examples has been the forcing of beagles, highly intelligent and sensitive animals, to smoke cigarettes in order to test the effects on the lungs of drugs which are, it is hoped, less lethal than the current tobacco mixtures.

So estranged have we become from the countryside, our natural home, that there is only a skeleton force of labor left there to produce the necessary food without which we should all perish; and this skeleton force sees no alternative but to transform agriculture which has been the basis of man's inseparability from Nature down the centuries into mechanized factory farming in which horse and oxen are replaced by the tractor and the beasts in many cases never see the light of day, being regarded exclusively as raw material on a conveyor belt of "economic" food production. The people, on the other hand, drawn by the lure of the cities, as if by an invisible magnet, live not in cottages but in mammoth buildings where a child has no

space in which to play and would require a telescope even to glimpse a horse, a tree or a flower. To mitigate the subsequent suffering and anti-social behavior we devise psychiatric therapies and expensive penal methods.

Again if we turn to a field where the demands on limited and expensive resources is ever expanding, the sphere of modern medicine, we find that contemporary thought relies in its therapeutic approach more and more on chemical and pharmaceutical techniques allied to increasingly technologically based surgery. Millions of people have come to accept the regular resort to some form of opiate or drug as a normal and necessary way of life. Childbirth is induced to meet the requirements of administrative convenience, babies are commonly reared artificially rather than naturally, spare-part surgery has extended to the human heart itself and resulted in orthodox medicine demanding the revision of the centuries-old definition of death in order to accommodate its new values, while in the laboratories we see the refrigeration of human spermatozoa and even attempts at the artificial laboratory culture of the human fetus itself. It is also not without significance that the world of art itself is so impoverished that no modern Capek exists to underscore the significance of these developments for our common humanity in the way that Capek did in his robot and insect plays in the 1930s.

At the very least I would wish to suggest that there is more than ample cause for misgiving about the general direction in which we appear to be traveling, and that the time is overdue for us to take stock and re-examine basic premises of current thinking that have for too long been left largely unchallenged. The present is not so much a time of cultural transition as a time of cultural breakdown when the assumptions of the last 400 years are beginning to be called in question. Those assumptions concern the religious life of man, out of which emerged the great and continuing conflict between religion and science. Historically the debate has been largely misconceived as one between the pseudo-Christianity of organized religion on the one hand and the right of the free intellect to pursue empirical inquiry whithersoever the truth might lead. In this classic

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conflict history triumphantly vindicated Copernicus, Bruno, Galileo against ecclesiastical obscurantism. And this drama, re-enacted many times, particularly during our era in the ecclesiastical attacks on Darwin and Freud, has distracted attention from the truly relevant debate which despite faint rumblings has never yet really got under way. I refer to the conflict between the spiritual values of genuine Christianity and the metaphysics of materialistic experimental science.

Although I cannot here touch on these very large issues, I would like to say something about the closely related topic of man's attitude to and relation with Nature itself. I am not suggesting that our understanding of God is derived from Nature, which is external and thus only imperfectly to be known. But Nature has been called the mirror in which God contemplates Himself and in this sense our conception of Nature is necessarily of some religious significance.

Although the concept of "Nature" is itself highly ambiguous and often even self-contradictory, it is significant that in reacting to many of the controversies cited at the outset of this essay, the emotions of many people even today would still derive from the intuitive feeling that certain proposals, for example, vivisection, high-rise flats, heart surgery, moon rocketry, are what they would call "unnatural." At the same time most people would probably be reluctant to apply the same adjective to other technological agencies which in logic it

would be difficult to describe as natural—for example, electric power (as distinct from nuclear power), electronic communications, the internal combustion engine, the engineering of dams, tunnels, turbines and bridges. There is in fact so much confusion in the emotions engendered by the concept of "unnatural" that one is tempted to reject it altogether and turn for guidance to simple moral principles that are not fraught with ambiguity. I think, however, that this would be a mistake. While Nature (whether we mean by it the countryside or the universe or principles governing nonhuman phenomena) is not a self-sufficient or all-embracing guide to conduct, we ignore it at our peril. And I do suggest that no small part of our contemporary sickness derives from our radical and increasing divorce from Nature and all that that entails, must entail for the true welfare of human beings. I would also suggest that this revolutionary and injurious change began to come about in the period of the European Renaissance and the ensuing epoch of the Baconian New Method, and that we are only now beginning to reap the full harvest of this great change embodied in the religion of so-called "Progress."

Let it be thought that I am advocating a crude anti-scientific doctrine, based on the delusion that the Rousseauesque "noble savage" really is noble, let me give an example of the kind of difference that I have in mind which

would distinguish a legitimate from an illegitimate scientific attitude. To Helmholtz, the celebrated 19th-century German physiologist, is attributed the remark: "If a human eye had been sent to me to test as an instrument for the reflection and refraction of light, I would have sent it back to the maker." In this purely mechanistic view, the eye is considered as a machine designed for a particular function and rejected by the scientist for its mediocre quality. But of course the human eye is not a machine designed just for one purpose. It is also the window through which the light of the human soul passes—so much so that Groddeck, sometimes referred to as "the wild analyst" on account of his own ironic, self-depreciatory use of the term, a friend of Freud, based his own psychotherapy in his Baden-Baden clinic in large part on the assumption that the eye provides the doctor with one of his most valuable signals, giving vital clues to the distress concealed within the mind of the patient.* Helmholtz and Groddeck were both scientists; but their views both of Nature and of science clearly rested on contrasting metaphysics. That such metaphysical differences underlying attitudes to Nature and the nature of science must lead to significant practical differences must surely be obvious. Not very long ago I met a boy, 8 or 9 years old, who had just recovered from an eye operation and was wearing glasses. The reason, I was told, was that the boy had begun to squint badly. I then learned that this development had first manifested itself shortly after the breakdown of his parents' marriage, and the consequent splitting of the parents and the sibling children. There may have been factors in the etiology of which I was unaware, but knowing as I do from direct personal experience how sharply eyesight can vary under emotional stress even in adults, I wish I could feel more confident that physiologists and ophthalmol-

* See Groddeck's *Psychoanalytische Schriften zur Psychosomatik*, 1966. For example: "Ophthalmology means the science of the eye. Is it not remarkable that not a single ophthalmological text-book takes note of the fact that with the eye one devours something, that with the eye one murders, transfixes someone, misses someone, that with it one makes eyes at or fishes for someone, that one can throw the eye like a stone, that with it one threatens and excites fear?"

Or again: "But we are of the opinion that the eye is not only for seeing but equally for avoiding seeing, that it has an innumerable host of functions to perform, which have nothing to do with seeing. . . ."

[My translation.]

FOUR THINGS CHOCTAW

1. Nashoba. *This my father taught me how to sing: Wolf, I look long for you. You know to hide your scrawn-y hide behind the darkest wind.*
2. Isuba. *Horse: not one less than twenty hands and all fast as hounds with foxes in their eyes and off. Chahta isuba cheli. Once Choctaws bred horses not many winds could catch. Listen: isuba still races winter's darkest wind.*
3. Baii. *Notice the oak, the high white bark, the heavy leaves, how they fall. Winters are long in mountains: springs freeze at the source and wind bows baii.*
4. Abukbo. *The feather that all my life I sought beyond the sun. I have fashioned a sacred shaft, smoothed it red with wet clay and poke. The feather will guide its arc down skies where grandfathers walk the woods quick with game, heavy with the wind's wild mint.*

Jim Barnes

ogists in particular were reared in a professional culture that paid at least as much attention to Groddeck's metaphysics as it does to that of Helmholtz.

At this point it might be well for me to indicate briefly my own metaphysical standpoint in this context. I believe that man, like the rest of the creation, is provided with a natural habitat, which if he treats it with due humility and respect, will provide him with all that is necessary and wise for him to have; that the meaning of his life derives not from a struggle to obtain mastery over Nature which he may reshape at will, still less from a struggle to obtain mastery over his fellow creatures but from a struggle to obtain mastery over his own base passions, base being defined as incompatible with his duty to strive at all times to put the interests of others before those of himself. This is a difficult task and is calculated to exercise a man or woman throughout the whole of life because while the capacity for love within the human being is deeply rooted and powerfully motivated, so also is the antithetical will to power, dominion and mastery over others. The people of medieval Christendom, despite the cruelty, ignorance and superstition that disfigured their lives, did at least hold to a metaphysic which I believe to be more accommodated to the genuine needs of our errant but nevertheless strongly aspirant human nature. The American philosopher, Edwin A. Burt, put it like this:

The world of nature existed that it might be known and enjoyed by man. Man in turn existed that he might "know God and enjoy Him forever." In this graciously vouchsafed kinship of man with an eternal Reason and Love, lay, for medieval philosophy, a guarantee that this whole natural world in its present form was but a moment in a great divine drama which reached over countless aeons past and present and in which man's place was quite indestructible.

Such a perspective was common to Aquinas, Dante, More, even Copernicus, himself still a child of medieval Christendom. But with Bacon and Descartes, with Kepler, Galileo and Newton, a new way of conceiving man's relation to Nature gradually came into being. In the light of the new knowledge, first of the globe itself brought back by Columbus, Henry the Navigator and other Renaissance adventurers, and then of the new cosmography constructed by mathematicians, astronomers and physicists, man seems to assume a vastly diminished significance in relation to the rest of the universe. Even more important, man began to lose his humility in the presence

of Nature; by discovering the secrets of her laws, he obtained power over Nature, and with power there goes always a growing sense of *hubris*, of arrogance. This we know from a different law, the moral law.

The universe portrayed in Dante's *Divine Comedy* is essentially a human universe possessed of purpose defined in humanly intelligible terms. This was consonant with a tradition going back two millennia. For Plato and even more for Aristotle a person or a thing was legitimately employed only when employed in accordance with its own nature, and every kind of species had a nature *sui generis* which provided its essential identity. Similarly the morality of the Stoics, from Zeno to Seneca, which lay at the core of European political thinking right down to the 18th century, was the belief that we should follow Nature, an all-embracing world order, resting on certain simple, rational laws emanating from the divine reason, every creature, every thing a part of the great chain of being reaching from the lowest and humblest right up to God in a single harmonious whole. The essential significance of the Romantic movement at the beginning of the 19th century lay in the attempt to recover and reassert something of the spirit of this fundamental and ancient reverence for Nature and found expression in the writings of Rousseau, Wordsworth, Shelley, Blake, Schiller, Lessing and Goethe. In Wordsworth the assertion is simple and authoritative that Nature teaches us more about ourselves and about the content of morality than "all the sages can." But this is surely to overlook the harsher elements in Nature's practices. Shelley is more intent to detail the metaphysic explicitly.

*I am the eye with which the Universe
Beholds itself and knows itself divine;
All harmony of instrument or verse,
All prophecy, all medicine is mine,
All light of art or nature. . . .*

But with the scientific revolution of the 17th century, initiated by such men as Copernicus, Bruno, Gilbert, and above all Galileo Galilei, Nature came to be conceived of within a new metaphysical framework, more severely practical, manipulative and pragmatic. These assumptions were aptly and succinctly summarized in the notorious aphorism of Sir Francis Bacon: Knowledge is Power. It is, of course; immense power. But it is also something else, namely, understanding; and this was an emphasis which came increasingly to fade and to be lost to sight. Galileo's unconscious emotional attachment to this principle that knowledge is power led him to a momentous metaphysical innovation. It

was one thing to grasp that nature is the domain of mathematics. For example, to cite a well-known passage from Galileo:

Philosophy is written in that great book which ever lies before our eyes—I mean the universe—but we cannot understand it if we do not first learn the language and grasp the symbols, in which it is written. This book is written in the mathematical language, and the symbols are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures without whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it.

But it was quite another thing to assert, as Galileo did, that the mathematical qualities, namely number, figure, magnitude, position and motion are the real or primary qualities of Nature; and that the sensible qualities of Nature, namely, the feel, smell, sight, taste, sound—all that constitutes the purely aesthetic wonder of Nature—are purely subjective, have no real external existence and are therefore secondary to the real mathematical qualities. In the case of Descartes, the rigid dualism between mind and matter that lay at the heart of the Cartesian metaphysics required him to make the assertion—from which he did not shrink—that animals were no more than machines without consciousness, the absurd falsity of which must be evident to any child, if not to the father of modern philosophy. It is true that the Church of Rome (the Protestants acquitted themselves no better) condemned itself forever by its persecution of Galileo for speaking the truth, but conservative metaphysicists of the time were right to be filled with the direst apprehensions regarding Galileo's metaphysics as distinct from his mathematics, dynamics and astronomy.

It is important that it should be more widely understood that there are two contrasting views of Nature—one stretching from the Greeks and in particular the Stoics down through the French Encyclopedists, which affirms a binding purpose in Nature, which men should seek to learn and obey. This view does not make the "nature" of anything what it actually does or is, but its purpose, that for which it was designed or made to fulfill. Everything, and above all a human life, has a purpose stemming from its part in the harmonious whole of Nature; to ignore or deny that purpose was to be guilty of *hubris* and could only lead to disaster, to self-destruction.

*Sweet is the love which Nature brings;
Our meddling intellect
Misshapes the beauteous forms of things
We murder to dissect.*

That view has now been superseded

almost in entirety. The modern view asserts that Nature is a vast, complex, closely integrated mechanism governed by mathematical laws or, at least, predictable on a statistical basis, by means of which knowledge accessible to human reason can be translated into human power to master, impose upon, rearrange Nature, even create altogether new elements unknown in Nature like plutonium which was the basis of the bomb dropped on Nagasaki, and all this according to purposes not found but made by man according to his whim or pleasure; for man is master of the universe. Modern man, like Faustus, has sold his soul in exchange for power; consequently his agony can only continue to grow and enmesh an ever-increasing number of victims, as more generations are born into a world further and further removed from its source in true values.

When Prof. T.H. Huxley visited America in 1876, he asked what was the tall tower and the building which then dominated the Manhattan skyline. "The Tribune and Western Union Telegraph Building," he was told. "Ah," replied Huxley, "that is interesting, that is American. In the Old World the first thing that you see as you approach a great city are steeples; here, you see, first, centres of intelligence." Well, today, all over the world, we have caught up. Almost everywhere the steeples are now dwarfed by the great skyscrapers of commerce, of the banks, of the palaces of merchandise and exchange, of getting and spending. And the new religion that sustains it all shows no signs of self-doubt or hesitation—like Moloch it devours all before it. As for the people, if some complain, their voices seem to make but little headway against the ceaseless barrage of propaganda reminding us of the "benefits" of technological advances and of the need to put into a "proper" perspective the fears of the alleged Jeremiahs. In order to insure that we keep pace with the headlong momentum of modernity and progress, our anxieties are allayed by endless reassurances by the "experts."

Edward Teller, the father of the H-bomb, as he is often called, sought to divert men's minds from the horrors caused by nuclear weapons by pointing out that nuclear power even in the form of the "super" bomb had positive peaceful uses. It could, he suggested, be used to redesign existing coastlines, where there is a deficiency of natural harbors. That this was no idle threat is already being demonstrated. The USSR has announced plans for nuclear civil engineering. An 80-mile canal is to be blasted through solid rock by using 250 nuclear

charges of up to 3 megatons each. The purpose is to divert water from northward flowing rivers into the Volga in order to arrest the drying up of the Caspian Sea. The usual reassurances are forthcoming with regard to the dangers of radioactive contamination and possible seismic consequences. The other peaceful use of atomic energy is already a well-established and fast-growing industry. Yet we are told that nuclear waste accumulating in Britain alone will require constant guarding by generations of our descendants for upwards of 100,000 years (*The Guardian*, October 22, 1975). It is difficult to conceive that any single generation of men could be so irresponsible as to arrogate to itself the right to impose such a burden on so many generations yet unborn, yet it has been and is being done.

What we need to do is to learn anew

something of an old humility, to learn to respect Nature, to understand and not to master, to work in harmony with, to cooperate with and learn from the other creatures in Nature who also have their part to play as ends in themselves and not simply as means to the purposes of men. We have had more than ample warning that there are yet unimagined horrors that lie in store for us if the false philosophy prevailing today is not effectively countered. We could do much worse than turn to America too for the antidote: for Henry Thoreau of Walden Pond in New England was, of course, also American. He wrote:

I once had a sparrow alight upon my shoulder for a moment while I was hoeing in a village garden, and I felt that I was more distinguished by that circumstance than I should have been by any epaulet I could have worn. □

They Also Serve Who Tell the Tale

ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN WAR AND PEACE: Politics and Ideology in the American Historical Profession. By Jesse Lemisch. Introduction by Thomas Schofield. New Hogtown Press (Toronto). 150 pp. Paper \$3.

PAUL BUHLE

"Deception of the people may in fact become increasingly necessary, unless we are willing to give our leaders in Washington a freer hand. . . . The yielding of some of our democratic controls of foreign affairs is the price that we may have to pay for greater physical security." So wrote a prominent American historian, almost exactly twenty-five years before the opening of the Watergate scandal. It is the thesis of Jesse Lemisch's study that such complicity is neither new, nor particularly "conservative" but simply the inner logic of American historians' adaptation to the welfare-warfare state.

Lemisch's book-length essay actually dates to 1969, and was submitted to (and refused by) the major historical journals. At last, a small, radical publishing house has replaced with a regular edition the hand-to-hand circulation of Xerox copies among graduate students, and has added an extensive introduction on the original New Left context from which the book derives, and the subse-

quent drift of events in the historical profession in the United States and Canada. Dipping into the book provokes a mental flashback to the vigorous scholarly self-criticism at the high point of a decade remarkable (in retrospect) for creating political confrontations in academe. Readers of widely varying political coloration will probably wince a little at being reminded of that troubled period, but may feel at last, that it is not healthy to forget too well.

At the tumultuous 1969 convention of the American Historical Association (see Ronald Radosh, "Annual Set-To: The Bare-Knuckled Historians," *The Nation*, Feb. 2, 1970) Lemisch brought hundreds of historians and other auditors to their feet with a shorter version of *On Active Service*, creating one of the few moments of Left unity at the meetings. While one element had argued for "neutrality" in the university, protected from radical (i.e., anti-war) as well as conservative influences, and another element suggested that scholarship be given a lower priority than activist politics, Lemisch appealed to historians to be radical as historians. The existing cold war, conservative-liberal historiography could best be overturned, he insisted, by seeking the truth in new ways.

Fired from the University of Chicago because of his leftist views and his sympathy for student movements, Lemisch was himself the major proponent of "History from the Bottom Up," the positive reassessment of the role of the dispossessed. His specialty has been the "Jack Tar," the seaman whose activity

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generated a little-remembered spark in the American Revolution and contributed materially to its outcome. Lemisch has subsequently explored the politics and culture of groups often dismissed by historians as "inarticulate," and been active in professional struggles to shift archival and editorial policies toward these ordinary folk. He has not succeeded in winning the profession to his methodological viewpoint, but there is more of a hearing than ever before, especially among the younger scholars, for the notion that the masses far more than the elite ultimately make history.

The indictment of consensus history in *On Active Service*—the leveling of historical conflicts by the writers of the 1950s in order to disguise the incendiary aspects of the Revolution, deny class conflict, demean radicals from Tom Paine to the Abolitionists and vindicate the late 19th-century robber barons as "industrial statesmen"—has been made before, most prominently by John Higham. But Lemisch goes after his foes without professional politeness, unhesitatingly attacking even liberal heroes like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., for the blatantly ideological (i.e., anti-Communist) character of their "objective," "pluralist" evaluation. His attacks become more savage when he recalls the experience of his own generation of young, idealistic historians confronting the mainstream in the 1960s: the double standard which found a Schlesinger praised because he "writes history as he votes," and a Staughton Lynd refused employment because his contributions were too "political"; or pronouncements defending the autonomy of the learning process when the administration was confronted by student radicals and the simultaneous cooperation of administrators (and sometimes faculty) with the FBI and state and local police in identifying the radicals.

Often it is difficult in reading Lemisch to disentangle his view of alternatives, past, present and future, from the sins he so picturesquely describes. In part this is because the issues of the 1960s, from the professional standpoint especially, offered a vastly better conception of what had gone wrong than of what could be done about it. Teachers and former students vividly remember that the rampant utopianism of the time was inchoate—and often enough entirely lost in the mutually destructive attacks between different elements of the university. Finally, of course, the student opposition to the Vietnamese War was thoroughly vindicated, and the university community almost as a whole fell into line (although, as Lemisch stresses, historians writing textbooks sometimes portray the peace

struggle as the work of Congress and of prominent intellectuals, unable to acknowledge the mass pressure from below on the part of students and their allies). All the revelations about government conspiracy have recently reinforced the inclination of thousands of professors of all ages to look with chagrin at the cold-war attitudes of their profession through the years. But how could these momentous examples of wrong-headedness have been avoided? Lemisch points to the necessity for more democracy, in professors' own lives, in their institutions, in their views of history and the people. Historians have failed not because they refused to grasp any particular viewpoint of the Left (he has himself been one of the most prominent radical historians to abjure Marxist methodology) but because they failed to be honest with themselves, with their students, with the community at large.


For all its appeal to conscience, this analysis leaves a moral vacuum in place of a causal explanation. Was it the corruption of American life, the juicy drippings from state and private funds, that lay behind the *hubris* of the "Vital Center"? Surely that is too simple. Not even the pervasive anti-Communist ideology outside the university can explain the

timid concessions to right-wing demands for faculty purges. Liberal academia followed the warfare state because it had accepted the tragic view that no alternatives existed. Dissent seemed locked up in a dreamy and impossible socialism, or alternatively identified with the activities of a Russian Government self-confessedly guilty of outrage on a grand scale. The malaise that struck American intellectual life reached from William Burroughs through Ralph Ellison to Dwight Macdonald, and was shared by a good many rank-and-file former Socialist and Communist activists who no longer saw the Golden Day in the foreseeable future. That academics, as part of the generations which experienced the sweeping disillusionment of the 1940s and 1950s, were so often gullible about the good will of the American Government and so slow to enter new social struggles and draw the conclusions about "Corporate Liberalism" are facts that cannot be brushed away. But the historical context of this failure of nerve demands examination.

One cannot but wish that Lemisch had taken this tack to explain the historians' institutional conservatism. Only a few decades ago, Charles and Mary Beard helped to educate a vast reading public

The successful cover-up of 1969 is the political bombshell of 1976.

THE LAST KENNEDY is a brilliant analysis of the Kennedy mystique by the author of the 1974 magazine article on Chappaquiddick which *Time* called "the political event of the year." The advance reviewer in *Publishers Weekly* calls it "a wise and tough... important book—for this or later campaigns."



about American history. Whatever the limitations of their work, this nation has seen nothing like its sweep, coherence and rich humanism since. The prestige of history as a profession at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s was somehow different, destined to be short-lived. That one historian found himself in the Kennedy administration, apologizing for the Bay of Pigs invasion, while another became a prominent campaigner for Boss Daley of Chicago and still others scuttled in and out of government circles as advisers and consultants—these were the false tunes of glory. The expectations of great social changes during the early Kennedy years were real enough, among sections of the public as well as the professors; but academia went along not as an independent force, not even as a coherent position, but as so many intellectuals hanging on to the shirttails of people with power in the “real” world. Perhaps it could not have been otherwise: the American Association of University Professors during the 1960s was not the CIO of the 1930s. But this internal development, the gradual disillusionment (and the declining prestige of the discipline) helps at least to explain the virulence of professors’ response to student radicalism: Cassandra voices crying out, “It doesn’t work! Save the university!” And the stage was set for spiritual debacle.

Of course, the tragedy is most personally dramatic in the lives of those radicals who were fired or who have never managed to get jobs for reasons related to their views. But the tragedy is no less real for the profession as a whole. Now historians look on as students turn to law, medicine, science and business, and wonder if the days of classroom challenges by angry graduate students were so bad after all. Worse, the cutbacks, layoffs and threats of financial calamity find the academic Left and Center without any rallying point for a counteroffensive.

Meanwhile, and ironically, American society at large has moved toward a greater historical self-consciousness. The artificiality of the Bicentennial celebration should not disguise the process of reflection that has been carried on in popular culture for years: the fads and fashions of the past, restrospects of old-time moods and morals, revived as “nostalgia”; the longing for rural ways present in so much contemporary music; the attitude expressed by Ann Landers or the comic strips that the American Imperium has had its day and gone into decline as did the Roman Imperium before. Historians like other intellectuals have remained largely aloof from this process, and the familiar split between

formal theory and mass inclination has once again been reaffirmed.

Yet the need for coherence remains, and the road is open for historians to shrug off their isolation and take up the tasks of the Beards. A new Oral History, focused on the lives of ordinary people, has helped to show how professionals can make their skills responsive to mass anguish and aspiration. New magazines, like the brilliant *Southern Exposure* of Atlanta and the peppery *North Country Anvil* of Millville, Minn., have helped revive historical conceptions of a progressive regionalism. A Radical Historians’ Caucus has for several years published a bulletin in Boston to connect the commitments of the 1960s to the problems and prospects of today. And local radical history groups, most notably the Mid-Atlantic Radical Historians’ Organization in New York, have been holding forums to span the gap between methodology and public issues. All these activities, in the context of a growing pool of people trained in historical studies but not employed in university circles, promise a kind of deprofessionalization of historical wisdom and practice. Somehow this potentiality must be united with the intellectual and financial resources of those

who remain inside university walls.

Negatively, the lessons of the past are eloquent about the traps inherent in academic collaboration with the suppression of the Left. Recent events at Yale, where Dr. Herbert Aptheker was denied an appointment at the behest of an *ad hoc* faculty committee including several prominent historians, are a reminder that free speech is constantly in jeopardy. Positively, historians need a program suggesting what we *can* do, for society and for themselves. Surely a wide-ranging alliance within the profession on the basis of economic and political issues directly affecting employed and unemployed historians is overdue. A demand for a form of WPA—some way for the historical skills of the jobless to be directed toward the recovery of local history and lore, and used in adult-education programs—has yet to be formulated. In a few years historians may find their professional and political vitality revived, and themselves participants in public life as they have not been for decades, or else ensconced in some academic nook, hard-pressed to maintain the remnants of power and prestige. *On Active Service* is an exhortation to choose between those eventualities and to act. □

Faulkner from Down Under

A BRIEF LIFE. By Juan Carlos Onetti. Translated by Hortense Carpentier. Grossman/Viking. 292 pp. \$10.

LUYS A. DIEZ

Borges, Cortázar, García Márquez and Vargas Llosa, among others, have in the last decade projected an image of Latin American letters as a vital alternative to the languishing state of world fiction. Their books loom large amid the bulk of foreign literature translated in this country. However, there have been important omissions, and the most blatant was that of Juan Carlos Onetti. Born in Uruguay in 1909, Onetti seemed to be a natural candidate for awards, wide readership and world recognition. Yet, all of them eluded him—and he cherished his place in the cold with the indifference of one of his own characters.

In 1939 he published his first novel, *El pozo* (“The Pit”), a powerful story of existentialist flavor at a time when existentialism had yet to acquire its universal literary identity. It was a new depar-

ture for the mostly rural oriented Spanish-American novel of social realism. Even today *El pozo* retains most of its freshness; every trait of Onetti’s art is already fully displayed in its pages.

Unperturbed by the fact that only a score of people read his first book, Onetti went on to write twelve more, almost equally divided between novels, novellas and short stories. None of them, however, made him popular or even solvent. He eked out a living by means of journalism, changing jobs and wives, as he drifted between provincial Montevideo and cosmopolitan Buenos Aires. Finally he settled down in Montevideo, as the not very generously paid Director of Municipal Libraries, to a retired state marked by bouts of poor health and insomnia. But that did not save him from the ruthless pettiness of the present dictatorship. In 1974, on account of the awarding of a literary prize, they threw Onetti and his fellow judges into jail. Uruguay, once famous for its democratic institutions, was no longer a fit place for independent intellectuals, even unsuccessful ones. Onetti went into exile.

A Brief Life is Onetti’s second book

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to be translated in this country. It was preceded in 1968 by *The Shipyard*, an allegory of Uruguay's decadence, which went virtually unnoticed. Its publication at the time probably had something to do with the "Ibero-American Award" bestowed on this novel by the William Faulkner Foundation in 1963, in keeping with Faulkner's wish to promote the best of Latin American fiction that was still unknown in the United States. This event could raise the question of whether or not Faulkner knew, before his death in 1962, that Onetti was one of his fervent admirers and his most distinguished disciple. But even if we never find out, it is still true that much of Faulkner's rich, dark sap flows through the meandering narrative art of Juan Carlos Onetti.

A Brief Life first appeared in the bookstores on both sides of the Rio de la Plata at the end of 1950. If few people read or understood it, even fewer realized that the great river separating the two Plata republics had acquired a new town—Santa María. The occurrence went unrecorded in the press of the time and is not in evidence in the latest maps of the area. Yet the town exists, boasting twenty-five years of history and a succession of deaths, marriages, births, a few suicides, some scandals, a score of local "characters," two newspapers, many bars, a couple of clubs, one hospital and one cathedral, an abandoned shipyard (which supplied the title for the novel mentioned earlier), and a thriving settlement of Swiss immigrants at the other end of the town, away from the murky river. But most important of all, Santa María has a founder, Brausen, long gone but not forgotten, and a chronicler in residence, Díaz Grey. Both the founder, rendered immortal by his equestrian statue in the old square, and the living recorder, who also practices medicine, start their strange existence in the pages of *A Brief Life*. And so does the town of Santa María.

Santa María is Onetti's own world, just as imaginary and yet as real as Faulkner's Yoknapatawpha County, or García Márquez's Macondo (its author is another South American "*faulkneriano*."). This is no utopian paradise but a very earthly hell peopled by wild nymphets, desperate women and misanthropic men engaged in fierce metaphysical struggles with their own self-destructiveness and the boundless perversity of the locals. Ultimately, Santa María symbolizes attitudes, habits and mores that are very much alive in the provincial communities of both Argentina and Uruguay.

Many of these elements, far from being exclusive to *A Brief Life*, are already manifest in Onetti's earlier works,

especially in *El pozo*, for they constitute his unchanged *Weltanschauung*. Unlike Sartre's nauseating blackness, Onetti's vision of society and human relations has a special gray coloring and a bitter-sweet taste. He has some of Céline's anarchistic gusto (without his nastiness), and both his manner and his concerns recall Pavese's lyrical treatment of time, memory and characterization. In any case, the spiritual closeness between Onetti and some of his characters is rather uncanny.

Actually, all these suggestions are mere approximations—a critic's point of reference in introducing a new writer. For Onetti's art is a strange aggregate of cultural characteristics and personal circumstances (some elusive, many contradictory and a few truly illuminating) none of which would really endear his writings to us were it not for the extraordinary nature of his style. His prose has a genuinely hypnotic force, digressive and meandering, but quite without apparent *longueurs*, studded with linguistic quirks and poetic flights, economically terse and playfully serious; he teases the reader with alternate scenarios for a given situation to concentrate afterwards on a passing thought or a seemingly unimportant gesture. He uses Zeugma and metaphor with the deadly flippancy we can admire in Dashiell Hammett or Raymond Chandler—two writers Onetti admires.


Fortunately, most of this comes through in the skillful translation of Hortense Carpentier, as illustrated in the following sentence: "I was looking, smiling, at the reddish bindings that protected the novels' happy endings and the sad odor of time." In other cases, she has captured both the healthy cynicism and subdued anguish of Onetti by paraphrasing with apt latitude.

The birth of Santa María, as a feature of the literature and the geography of the Rio de la Plata, takes place after a tortuous and painful confinement—the pain being almost equally shared by the begetter, Brausen, and the patient reader of *A Brief Life*. But in glossing this aspect of the novel, the critic, too, goes into labor, for he is forced to outline the plot. And there's the rub, for any outline of the plot must read like a piece of automatic writing or a collection of dreams experienced by different persons. Here are the main points. A lonely man, Brausen, fretfully waits in a Buenos Aires apartment on a sultry summer evening. His mind is a whirlpool of memories and forebodings. His life seems to be caving in. He feels an overwhelming sense of impending doom, laced with an almost hysterical elation at the intima-

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MYTH

Translucent wings
she grew that night
and flew
out the open window.

All night she spun
a supple net.

Moon, lovers, the trees,
the kiss and the stars:
on these she fixed
her fine strong thread.

Before the break of day
she stood back

aimed at the net
and with sunrise
—dead center—
threw in her heart.

Ricardo da Silveira Lobo Sternberg

tion that something about to happen will check his despair. He is waiting for his wife, Gertrudis, to return from an operation that has removed her left breast and mutilated her spirit. As he waits he overhears a conversation in another apartment where a woman, a broken-down call girl, spews out to a visitor her hatred of men. She is to become one of Brausen's avenues for fantasy and escape. Another starts to take shape the following night as he nurses his sick wife. Brausen, who works for a publicity firm, places all his hopes of salvation on the writing of a film script—if it is successful he can quit an odious job, move out of the city with his wife and, who knows, they might even have a child.

At first his script is just a handful of loose ideas revolving around a town, Santa María, and a middle-aged doctor, Díaz Grey. But as *A Brief Life* unfolds it follows a triple course. First, there is Brausen's own life as he remembers past failures and tries, half-heartedly, to carry on with his professional and social obligations. Second, there is the life of Queta, to whom he feels perversely attracted. Third, there is Santa María and Brausen's *Doppelgänger*, the disdainful doctor Díaz Grey. Toward the end of the book, Brausen, who has escaped to his created city, runs into his own creature, Díaz Grey, who with a group of friends is celebrating the carnival on the streets of Santa María.

Thus ends *A Brief Life*, which is anything but brief or easy to read, and which inaugurates the so-called "Saga Sanmariana"—a series of stories loosely related and cross-referenced to this seminal, founding novel. *The Shipyard*, origi-

nally published in 1961, is an important part of the saga which now should be sought out by those American readers whose appetite has been whetted by their experience with *A Brief Life*. Onetti's novelistic magic, like Faulkner's, requires a certain amount of perseverance on the reader's part. But after exposure to a few of his novels, a certain kind of reader gets so involved in Onetti's style and so identifies himself with his vision of the world, that very little else in contemporary fiction can be as satisfying. □

THEATRE

HAROLD CLURMAN

Art is both particular and general. The truism is exemplified in *Zalmen or The Madness of God* (Lyceum Theatre). Its author, Elie Wiesel, whose wife, Marion, translated the book from the French and adapted it for the stage, is known as a Jewish writer. Though his entire literary output is centered on themes of Jewish concern, the play's significance extends beyond its basic matter. The plot deals with the Jews in the Soviet Union, but its idea has a universal reach. It is the most adult, intelligent, serious, humanly gripping and thus profoundly entertaining play on Broadway for many a long day.

It takes place during the late 1950s in a small town of the USSR where the diminishing community of Orthodox Jews congregates in a tiny synagogue. The high holiday, Yom Kippur, is about to be celebrated. Just before the rituals are to begin the Chairman of the Synagogue Council, who is the link between the communicants and the government, calls them together for a special meeting. He has been informed by the Inspector from the Ministry of Religious Affairs that a group of actors from various foreign countries—only four of whom are Jews—have asked permission to visit the initial service. The authorities have granted the request, with the warning that no one in the congregation is to make any contact whatsoever with the visitors—not even by way of greeting. Official informers will be present to see that the order is strictly observed.

Though a tremor of disquiet pervades the congregation, all acquiesce in the ministry's injunction: it will be followed to the letter. They want no trouble, since the least indication that their lot in the country is not a happy one would jeopardize their already precarious position.

Zalmen, the synagogue's *shamus* (caretaker), is tolerated as a submissive, over-talkative, half-demented creature whose most sacred duty is to be of help to the congregation's aged and infirm but revered Rabbi. The latter is a holy person, steeped in religious study and contemplation, committed only to the preservation of the faith in the sparse company of the believers. But there burns in Zalmen a spark of rebellion and with quiet intensity he seeks to inspire the Rabbi with his own furtive resistance. The Rabbi, Zalmen stingingly insinuates, must now break the bonds of pious caution and cry out the agony of his people so that the world may hear of it. It would be madness to do so, but it is the madness of God—for He is not a God of "reason."

With all his force the Rabbi rejects the temptation. But during the crucial moment of the service he becomes possessed by the "madness of God" and shrieks a protest: his people are being crushed, the light of their godliness is fast being extinguished. The service is halted, an investigation is instituted under the supervision of a Commissar. What he and the Inspector want to discover is who, or what, prompted the Rabbi's denunciation. The Rabbi, confused and horrified, repeatedly asserts that he does not understand what caused his outburst, but that he alone is guilty and is willing to submit to any punishment the authorities may mete out to him. When the Chairman of the Synagogue Council, as puzzled and frightened as are all the others by the Rabbi's aberration, assures the Inspector that whatever its cause it could not possibly have been political, the Inspector replies that all things today are political. But in the end no one is prosecuted: the incident being trivial has no direct consequences.

This meager summary gives hardly a notion of the play's design or quality. In the first place, it is a kind of rabbinical or Hasidic tale, something that never did or could occur, a once-upon-a-time fable told us by Zalmen himself. The development of the action, moreover, permits Wiesel to introduce a variety of well-limned figures representative of different attitudes. The main body of the congregation is composed of the helpless small fry. There are also a Doctor, a decorated ex-officer of the Soviet army, who is disturbed by the ambiguity of his place in the congregation as well as by a vague sense of guilt in regard to it; the Rabbi's son-in-law, a party member, resolved upon a complete break with the old tradition; the Chairman of the Synagogue Council, a suffering and prag-

ALL I EVER WANTED WAS A GOD

*I keep trying to be Leda,
but no one presses his feathers
hard on my thighs; no one
catches my hair in his beak,
pulling me hot through the sky.
Nobody even gets jealous
of the birds I keep caged.
I'd like to pretend indifference,
but the ponds of my dreams
keep filling with swans
and my rationalizations:*

*the men I've loved rarely
had hollow bones, and
Olympians frequently make bad
husbands, and who, after
all, would really want Helen
for a daughter*

just sound like sour grapes.

Susan Bartels

matic protector of the remnant community; the shrewdly efficient Inspector and the steely Commissar whose ruthless contempt is based on the conviction that in the police state no one is innocent and therefore no one is safe.

There is tenderness in the play without sentimentality, and a "mystic" belief that to be a Jew is to affirm life, but that this affirmation is in itself outside the realm of "pure" rationality though it is still to be contained within reason. Wiesel's faith embraces a perhaps innate but in any case accepted and cultivated moral order, a sense of responsibility, a humanitarian "messianism" without fanaticism or ostentation. Throughout the play one is aware that this "mysticism" is in the secure control of a lucid objectivity, a capacity for balanced judgment, close observation and gentle humor.

Quite apart from the play's immediate social implications, what emerges is the deep demand that we see the human condition as a challenge to live in the only way life can be well-lived: through an integrity which views each person as part of the whole, an active respect for and a sharing in our common destiny. For we are inextricably bound to others in ties which, if they are not to be destructive, must be rooted in love. But for this one must be "mad" enough to struggle and manifest one's faith with an exemplary passion, so that everyone may hear and see. Failing this, we become slaves or slugs. And that is the way our civilization now seems to be going.

The play begins and ends as if it were folklore. This may lend it a certain

grace, a reticent "distance." But it also presents a stylistic problem, not to say a difficulty. For there is verisimilitude, even factual objectivity, in all the play's details. Yet it cannot be set down as realism. A more subdued or nuanced, a less vociferously emphatic tone might be conceived for the production, one momentarily less strikingly symbolic or "epically" declarative. Zalmen, for example, played in resonant voice and sharp outline by the towering Richard Bauer, is staged and projected as more prophet than the sprite-like (possibly dwarfish) inspiring being that the *shamus* might be made to appear. At one moment, when Zalmen contends with the Rabbi, they grapple in a posture that reminds one of Jacob wrestling with the angel.

Alan Schneider has chosen a scenic interpretation which leans toward the dramatically aggressive. I cannot say that he has erred in his choice, though it removes the play somewhat from folk truthfulness. But the contradiction of modes I perceive resides in the script itself. (William Ritman's setting is either too literal or is insufficiently abstracted toward a lyric atmosphere.) However, I mention another sort of staging only as a possibility.

There is perhaps too much *pounding* but, all things considered, the production works. The cast, though occasionally orotund, pushing too hard, and too "out-front effective," is uniformly admirable in its loyalty to the play's overt message. Joseph Wiseman as the Rabbi is graphically expressive. There is a long passage in the interrogation scene during which he sits in dejected silence and bewilderment; the seeming hopelessness of his

sorrow is hauntingly conveyed. Even more touching and eloquent is the melancholy exaltation in the Rabbinical melody of his speech, breathing a sweet forbearance which calms an inner fire. And how much searing anguish there is in Wiseman's wild protestation!

The cast is too large to give all the players their due. Especially notable, however, is the tension of the Chairman's painful compromise as played by Paul Sparer, the simple directness of David Margulies's imperfectly poised Doctor, the homespun comedy of Michael Gorrin and Zviah Igdalsky as two elderly witnesses at the investigation. All in all an important and memorable play. □

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ART / Lawrence Alloway

Through September the Whitney Museum will be showing "200 Years of American Sculpture." It is a Bicentennial spectacular occupying the whole museum. The show runs chronologically from the second floor up, beginning with 1776-1900. Here are found folk art and academic sculpture (color coded by pinkish walls) with a pocket of aboriginal art (color coded green for the reservation). On the third floor are two periods, 1900-30 and 1930-50; one color coded pale green, the other a modernistic black, gray and white. Finally, on the fourth floor, the biggest area, the sculpture of the last two decades expands. That is to say, the historical periods represented are 124 years, fifty years and twenty years.

Thus the form of the exhibition is that of a march through a couple of centuries with our own period as a climactic reassurance of present greatness in art (the biggest). It must be difficult when making up the scenario for a progressive

show of this sort to avoid self-congratulatory nationalism. There is no sign, however, that scruples on that score inhibited the organizers at any point. Thus the representation of Indian art is perfunctory and bears no relation to the stylistic and cultural assumptions of the rest of the show. By comparison, the wooden folk art is clearly of the same Western culture as the white marble sculpture, but the Indians are dragged in to pay their homage to American vitality and capaciousness.

On the third floor a doubt that had nagged one on the second became insistent. Why is the sculpture so small? There is no sign of the monumentality that Daniel Robbins discusses in the catalogue as characteristic of the 1900-30 period. The public iconography that he recounts gets a shrunken showing in intimate pieces on a private scale. A great many works have been assembled from a variety of sources, but not enough of them at public scale. The recent Mark di Suvero exhibition demonstrates that there is no financial or technical reason not to borrow big works when the money is available, and the expenses for "200 Years" were paid for by the Chase Manhattan Bank and the National Endowment for the Arts.

There are too many small pieces until one gets to the fourth floor, where there are too many big ones. The message is the connection of modernism and Americanism. The contemporary work is the crown and culmination of American sculpture. This has its irony and possible embarrassment for those artists who have usually seen their work as specifically American but in a fundamentalist kind of way, not as part of the support system of institutional programs. Yet here are Carl Andre, Dan Flavin and Robert Morris, for instance, all with records of political dissent, appearing in a patriotic exhibition whose theme is American productivity in the arts. There are ideological problems attached to Bicentennial exhibitions organized merely on the basis of optimistic abundance, but the artists are all present in the Bicentennial peak hour.

The other thing that is wrong with the show is the installation. I mentioned color coding, usually taken to be a clarifying device. However, half the third floor is pale green (cued perhaps by the patina of a bronze?), including ranked walls of tinted plexiglass, the meaningless reflections of which produce an indeterminate, slightly underwater, space. All

the little sculptures get lost in the flashy display. Also on this floor is a group of David Smith sculptures placed, with unbelievable vulgarity, before a photographic blowup of the landscape in which the sculptor had his studio. The cyclorama has the effect of blunting the formal bite of Smith's edges and angles, stranding them in an imaginary space, which is not the way to show sculpture, any sculpture.

The installation, by Robert Venturi and John Rauch, is consistently callous toward the works they are supposed to be showing. On the fourth floor, for example, the Flavin fluorescent light piece is used to illuminate the Andre sculpture, placed on the floor beneath it. One of the problems of installing Flavin is precisely to separate him from the lighting fixtures, but Venturi and Rauch have not considered this. The Whitney contains the only drab set of Joseph Cornell boxes I have ever seen: the lights are angled so as to cast a dark shadow at the top of each box, obscuring the precise constructions within. You get Rembrandtesque Cornells. There is a bunch of Calder mobiles and stabiles on a fancy stage and this, by contrast, is strongly lit, with the result that his slender linearism loses whatever three-dimensionality it had. A press release states: "the exhibition settings are designed to focus the viewers' attention on the sculpture and on the inner play of pieces and the schools they represent rather than upon a display of exhibition techniques." That sounds fine, just what a display should do, but it was written by somebody who had not seen the exhibition. The objects are presented on a principle of melee (confusion, turmoil, jumble), with frivolous design decisions overriding the form and meaning of the art itself.

One of the numerous sculptors outside the Whitney's curators' conservative adherence to a narrow *avant-garde* is Marjorie Strider, a selection of whose work can be seen at the CUNY Graduate Center Mall, 33 West 42nd Street (until April 3). Since the early 1960s she has stretched the two-dimensionality of painting and squeezed the three-dimensionality of sculpture in a series of inventive exchanges. A group of these works is shown, along with a new piece, "Stair Pour III," in which urethane foam and dry pigment have been poured (and steered) down the steps to the auditorium, making a multicolored, sluggish, implacable intrusion into the architectural setting. It is a remarkable example of personal imagination projected on a public scale. □

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
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Crossword Puzzle No. 1626

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

- 1 A place in Illinois—not much fun to sail poorly fitted out, but spectacular. (6,8)
- 8 Hardy girl, and one associated with the fireplace turning into what should be checkering. (12)
- 10 Put too much weight on one end, with the coat unable to be tailored. (10)
- 11 It might be a map of Lapland, but not a little one. (4)
- 13 A Carib language form? (6)
- 14 In the main, everything confused. (3,2,3)
- 16 Ate there daily, tied inside. (8)
- 17 The man of 16 at last passed on and did what smoke or water does in turn. (6)
- 19 Possibly confessed to having French blood. (4)
- 20 A word of warning before a unique move on board the ship, in part. (10)
- 22 No surprise concerning the success of the child prodigy? (6,6)
- 23 It doesn't imply one in charge of defense is necessarily bad. (8,6)

DOWN

- 1 What the screen lion evidently believed in might imply a selfish corner in Camelot. (3,3,4,4)
- 2 It had three tongues. (7,5)
- 3 Some who fail might hope to be. (10)
- 4 Poster for dance and song, perhaps. (6)

5 With the tire burst, a difficult clue is made into a bag. (8)

- 6 The famous river of the rising star. (4)
- 7 Common carrier? Not exactly, though a leader in the field, with color. (8,6)
- 9 A peculiarly tall daisy's an early November occurrence. (3,6,3)
- 12 Male in female dress, otherwise a form of narcotic. (10)
- 15 Ask to get up to a number procreated in the old-fashioned way. (8)
- 18 Want to do away with the law? Ring again! (6)
- 21 Coat that certainly isn't heavy, but might be a little dirty. (They've made a movie out of it.) (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1625

ACROSS: 1,6 and 13 Washington Post March; 10 Lumbago; 11 Swaddle; 12 Radiates; 15 Onset; 17 Spurred on; 19 So to speak; 21 Lapse; 23 Cubic; 24 Root beer; 27 Accused; 28 Invader; 29 Eton; 30 Snuggled up. DOWN: 1 and 14 Wild goose chase; 2 Sampans; 3 Iraqi; 4 Good taste; 5 Oasis; 7 Ordered; 8 The Thinker; 9 Balmoral; 16 Test case; 18 Unknowing; 20 Tobacco; 22 Pleaded; 24 Rodin; 25 Bevel; 26 Prop.

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